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THE SEARCH FOR CONSISTENCY: TREATMENT
OF NONMARKET ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION
UNDER UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS
Robert H. Lantz

INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the 1980s with the People's Republic of China (PRC),
and continuing in the 1990s with the nations of Eastern Europe and the
states of the former Soviet Union, countries with state-controlled
nonmarket economies (NMEs) have begun to institute market reforms.
These market reforms raise questions concerning the adequacy of United
States antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws to deal
with imports from economies in transition. The United States Commerce
Department has twice introduced new approaches for administering the
AD law in cases involving economies in transition in an attempt to keep
pace with the market reforms in these countries.'
However, the Clinton Administration has pursued inconsistent policies
concerning the amendment of United States AD and CVD laws to accommodate economies in transition. Initially, statements by Secretary of
Commerce Ron Brown indicated that the Clinton Administration
disfavored amending the AD and CVD laws despite the market reforms
underway in NME countries In fact, only a week prior to introducing
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1. See infra notes 254-73 and accompanying text (discussing the two approaches
of the Clinton Administration for NMEs in transition) (the terms "NMEs in transition"
and "economies in transition" will be used interchangeably in this article).
2. Brown Douses Reform of Antidumping Laws For Non-Market Economies,
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the implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round of the General

Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT),3 the Administration felt it
unnecessary to amend United States AD and CVD laws in cases involving NME in transition countries.4 However, just before presenting the
implementing legislation to congressional committees for review, the
Administration reversed itself and decided to include proposals altering

the treatment of NME in transition countries.5 Following three months
of debate by various congressional committees, the House and Senate
conferees agreed to drop the economies in transition proposals from the
Uruguay Round implementing legislation.6 Then, the day after introduction of the implementing legislation, thereby making it unamendable

under the Congress' fast-track authorization, President Clinton, in a joint
press conference with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, indicated that he
would pursue legislation designating Russia as an economy in transition
under United States AD law.' These events reflect the inconsistent ap-

U.S. TRADE, Jan. 28, 1994, at S-22 (quoting Secretary Brown). There, Brown
stated in a January 24, 1994 press conference that the Administration had "no specific
plans" to review the AD law relating to nonmarket economies. Id. Additionally, he
stated that, "[The Department of] Commerce is charged with the mission of enforcing
the antidumping and countervailing duty laws on the books... [w]e intend to do
that aggressively." Id.
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
4. INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Special Report, June 17, 1994, at S-i (reporting that as
late as June 17, 1994, the Administration rejected proposals for changing the AD
methodology applied to NMEs).
5.
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Special Report, June 21, 1994, at S-1, S-22-23 [hereinafter Special Report, June 21, 1994] (stating that "the proposal for economies in
transition represents a reversal for the Administration, which had made it clear late
last week that it did not want to change antidumping methodology for non-market
economies in the Uruguay Round implementing bill"); see also infra notes 253-73 and
accompanying text (outlining specifics of the proposed changes in methodology).
6. See U.S. Reassures Chile of Commitment to Free Trade Deal, U.S. Officials
Say, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1442 (Sept. 21, 1994) [hereinafter 1TR] (reporting
on Congressional action relating to NME countries).
7. Press Conference by President Clinton and President Yeltsin, 1994 WL
525367, at 7-8 (White House).
Question: "Now COCOM and antidumping campaign, are there any specific
decisions--any specific time lines and schedules and solutions?" President
Clinton: "With regard to the antidumping, I think what you're referring to is
my attempts to get the Congress to pass legislation which would declare Russia
an economy in transition, which would facilitate more two-way trade. I have
proposed such legislation to the Congress; it has not yet passed. We are working on a package of initiatives which would include the reduction of trade
INSIDE
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proaches of the United States as to whether, or how, to alter American
unfair trade laws to address the market reforms underway in Eastern
Europe, the former Soviet Union and the PRC.
To understand United States policy regarding NMEs in transition, it is
important to understand the theory and practice that has governed the
treatment of NMEs both before and after the introduction of market
reforms. An understanding of the theory underlying both United States
AD and CVD laws and prior administrative practices concerning NMEs
will produce a trade policy responsive to the needs of NMEs implementing market reforms, while remaining consistent with the principles at the
heart of United States unfair trade laws. Furthermore, such a policy
actually will support the measures that economists agree are necessary
for these countries to implement their market reforms successfully.
This article reviews the treatment of NMEs and NMEs in transition
under United States AD and CVD laws. This article also discusses an
approach for dealing with economies in transition that takes account of
the market reforms while remaining consistent with the principles governing United States unfair trade laws. Section I reviews the economic
theory underlying United States AD law, as well as the treatment of
NME manufacturers under United States AD law. Section II reviews the
economic theory behind United States CVD law and analyzes that law
as it relates to NMEs. Section III provides an overview of the steps
economists believe N!IvE nations must adopt to transform successfully
into market-driven economies. Section III also discusses attempts by the
Department of Commerce (Commerce) to formulate a policy for treating
NMEs in transition under current United States unfair trade laws. Section IV critiques several proposals to amend United States unfair trade
laws relating to economies in transition, and provides the author's recommendations. Finally, the article provides concluding thoughts.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF DUMPING AND UNITED
STATES ANTIDUMPING STATUTES
Before discussing the specifics of United States AD statutes, it is
important to understand the economic rationale supporting the creation
and enforcement of United States AD law. The economic analysis relating to dumping is the same for both market economies and NMEs.

barriers in Russia and some more initiatives on our part so that we could get
that kind of economy in transition status .. .
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However, the administration of United States AD law differs with regard
to NMEs because Commerce historically has been unable to verify costs
and prices in an economy where the government, and not the market,
determines the allocation of resources. After describing the economics of
dumping and the general process for administering the United States AD
statutes for market economies, the following discussion will address the
specific difficulties relating to NMEs.
A. THE ECONOMICS OF DUMPING
Dumping is defined as the sale of foreign merchandise in the United
States at less than fair value (LTFV) or below the cost of production!
Dumping cases involving market economies require a comparison of the
price paid for the merchandise in the United States with the
merchandise's foreign market value (FMV).9 Therefore, determining
whether dumping has occurred requires an analysis of market prices in
the United States and the value of the good outside the United States. 0
To eliminate differences in the manner in which goods are sold in various markets, a manufacturer's foreign and domestic prices charged for
the merchandise are reduced to the factory cost." The price of the
merchandise in the foreign market then is converted into United States
dollars for purposes of comparison. Dumping occurs when the exfactory price of the foreign merchandise sold in the United States is less
than the ex-factory price charged for comparable merchandise sold in
the foreign manufacturer's domestic market or a third market. 3

8. See TARIFF ACT OF 1930, Pub. L. No. 98-573, Title VI, § 602(b), 98 Stat.
3024 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1988)) [hereinafter the TARIFF
ACT OF 1930, as amended] (defining "dumping"); Michael S. Knoll, An Economic Approach To The Determination Of Injury Under The United States Antidumping And
Countervailing Duty Law, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 37, 42-44 (1989) (explaining
the definition of dumping); David M. Repp, Note, Antidumping And Countervailing
Duties: Protection At A Cost, 15 J. CORP. L. 65, 70-72 (1989) (describing
antidumping as unfair barrier).
9. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.42, 353.46 (1994); Knoll, supra note 8, at 42.
10. See Michael Sandier, Primer on United States Trade Remedies, 19 INT'L LAW
761, 763 (1985) (describing analysis employed to determine when a product is
"dumped").
11. Knoll, supra note 8, at 42.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (1988).
13. See Sandier, supra note 10, at 763 (explaining final analysis in determining
whether product is dumped); Knoll, supra note 8, at 43 (same).
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Dumping may occur under several different conditions. For instance,
short term or sporadic dumping may occur as a foreign manufacturer
attempts to sell unwanted or outdated merchandise."' Predatory dumping
is a deliberate attempt by a foreign manufacturer to underprice its competition in its export market by temporarily lowering prices to gain
market share or to drive competition out of the market'

However,

most observers believe that dumping occurs most often as a form of
international price discrimination. 6 Specifically, price discrimination is
a function of the manufacturer selling comparable products at different
prices in different markets." Economists have found that for a firm to
engage in "classic" price discrimination, the firm must operate under
conditions where markets are separable, the firm has market power, and
the two markets have different levels of demand for the product.

14. See THE MIT DICrIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 115 (David W. Pearce
ecL, 4th ed. 1986) [hereinafter MIT DICTIONARY] (defining short term or sporadic
dumping). Jacob Viner performed the ground-breaking work in the area of dumping.
JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923).

15. MIT DICTIONARY, supra note 14. at 115 (defining predatory dumping); PETER
H. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMI9CS 183 (8th ed. 1986) (discussing predatory
dumping). According to Lindert, predatory dumping occurs when a foreign firm temporarily discriminates in favor of foreign buyers to lower the market price, win market share, and eliminate competitors, before raising its prices after the competition is
no longer in the market. Id. Some companies, however, may desire to gain market
share even if they are not able to completely drive competition from the market and
raise prices to recover the initial loss. Id.
16. See Jeffrey E. Garten, New Challenges in the World Economy:. The
Antidumping Law and U.S. Trade Policy 8 (Remarks Before the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 1994)) (defining dumping broadly as price
discrimination between national markets). Mr. Jeffrey Garten is the Under-Secretary of
Commerce for International Trade. ld.;
see also Richard D. Boltuck, An Economic
Analysis of Dumping, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 45, 45-46 (stating that although predatory pricing is tied to the origin of United States AD law, economists believe predatory dumping is not a "frequent phenomenon").
17. See Boltuck, supra note 16, at 46 (defining price discrimination); IJNDERT,
supra note 15, at 184-89.
18. See id., at 46-47 (defining "classic" price discrimination). Classic price discrimination provides that:
1) Markets are separable. This means customers purchasing the same product in
different markets cannot trade among themselves, thereby equalizing the price
through arbitrage;
2) The firm has market power in at least some markets. Market power means
the firm will not lose all sales if it raises its price. (Monopoly is the extreme
case of market power.) Raising the price will have two effects on the revenue
of such a firm: it will increase due to the higher unit price, but fall due to
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When these conditions exist, price discrimination results in a firm maximizing its profits. 9
Dumping theory is premised on a series of assumptions governing the
effect on domestic producers when a foreign manufacturer lowers prices
below fair market value or cost as part of a strategy of price discrimination. The first assumption is that, when a foreign firm dumps products
in the United States, domestic producers that cannot compete at lower
prices will lose market share or be driven from the market."0 United
States consumers initially enjoy lower prices due to the dumping of foreign merchandise.2' The second assumption is that, after United States
firms lose considerable market share or are driven from the market, the
foreign firm will recoup its initial losses by charging a higher price, or
failing to lower the price, for its merchandise.' To counteract the negative long-term effects of dumping, AD duties are imposed to nullify the
impact of a foreign fin's dumping practices.
As part of the dumping determination, dumping margin must be calculated as accurately as possible to assess an AD duty equal to the
amount by which the FMV of the foreign merchandise exceeds the
United States price. The AD duty is not intended to punish the for-

smaller sales volume;
3) The demand curves for different markets have different elasticities [defined
as the percentage change in quantity sold caused by a one percent increase in
price]. This means customers are more responsive to price changes in some
markets than in others. The f'n will charge a lower price in the market where
customers are more price responsive.
Id.

19. See LINDERT, supra note 15, at 184-85 (illustrating this point with a hypothetical example using the United States and Japan).
20. Repp, supra note 8, at 71 (explaining that the ultimate result of predatory
dumping is that all competitors are driven out of business); Garten, supra note 16, at
10 (explaining adverse consequences of dumping). Mr. Garten states: "[dlumping sends
false signals to the market .

. .

. The ability to dump acts as a disincentive to in-

vestment in the country where dumping is occurring and fosters excessive investment
in the market of the dumper .

. .

. Dumping has a dramatic effect on investors' deci-

sions." Id.
21. Repp, supra note 8, at 71.
22. Id. at 71; see RICHARD G. LiPsEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 790, 800 (7th ed.
1984) (explaining that a successful predatory strategy eventually drives domestic producers out of business and allows foreign producers to raise prices because of the
consumer's dependence on imports).
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(e) (1988); Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.
Supp. 1185, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that accurate dumping margins are
necessary to accomplish purpose of the AD statute).
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eign firm; rather, it is intended to deter the foreign firm from continuing
its dumping practices. ' Denying the benefits of dumping to the foreign
manufacturer forces a profit-maximizing firm to raise the price of its
merchandise sold in the United States while simultaneously lowering the
price in markets where it charged a higher price.' In theory, the foreign producer eventually will charge a single price in both markets that
falls between the original foreign market and United States prices,
Antidumping duties serve three purposes. First, they protect domestic
industry and jobs in the short run from the effects of unfair pricing
from abroad. The second purpose is connected to the first; namely, AD
duties prevent foreign manufacturers from dumping products into the
United States altogether. Finally, AD duties ultimately protect the consumer from higher prices. In theory, AD statutes are designed to even
the playing field between foreign firms dumping products and United
States firms facing the prospect of losing market share due to unfair
foreign pricing practices. However, under the facts of a given case it
may be difficult to discover whether dumping is occurring or to calculate the amount by which the foreign firm is dumping products into the
United States market. It also may be difficult to determine whether a
foreign firm's dumping practices have injured United States firms in the
industry. Commerce has been charged with the difficult task of determining whether dumping has occurred, and the International Trade Commission (ITC) is responsible for determining if a United States industry
has been harmed as a result of dumping.
B. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING LAW
The United States Congress first promulgated AD statutes as part of
the Revenue Act of 1916 However, this legislation proved inadequate
because United States petitioners were required to prove that the foreign

24. See Badger-Powhatan, Div. of Figgie Intern., Inc. v. United States, 608 F.
Supp. 653, 657 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (stating that antidumping law is remedial and
not punitive); William E. Perry, Administration of Import Trade Laws by the United
States International Trade Commission, 3 B.U. INT'L L. J.345, 381 (1985) (same).

25. Boltuck, supra note 16, at 48.
26. Id.; Lindert, supra note 15, at 185.
27. See Ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 756, 789-99 (1921) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 72
(1988), cited in Greyson Bryan and Dominique Guy Boursereau, Antidumping Law in
the European Communities and The United States: A Comparative Analysis. 18 GEo.
WASH. J.INT'L L. & ECON. 631, 665 (1985) (discussing frst AD statutes).
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company intentionally dumped its products into the United States.28
Although the portions of the 1916 Act serving as an antidumping corollary to the Robinson-Patman antitrust statute survive to this day, Congress replaced almost all of the 1916 Act when it enacted the
Antidumping Act of 1921.29
Since the end of World War II, countries have sought to promote
international trade by negotiating multilateral agreements to lower tariffs,
to reduce or eliminate nontariff barriers, and to harmonize the remedies
available for unfair trade practices such as dumping. For instance, Article VI of GATT, adopted in 1947, condemns dumping and permits
GATT members to enact AD duties." The GATT Antidumping Code,
negotiated in 1979 during the Tokyo Round, served as the first effort to
harmonize the substantive, and to a lesser extent, the procedural aspects
of the members' AD statutes.3' The 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT constitutes a further refinement of the AD
rules and is incorporated into United States law through the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act.32 As a signatory to GATT, the Antidumping
Code, and the 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
GATT, the United States has implemented AD statutes consistent with
these agreements.33 The specific provisions of United States AD statutes
reflect Congress' intent to enforce the AD statutes through a bifurcated
system in which Commerce determines the amount of dumping, if any,

28. Bryan & Boursereau, supra note 27, at 665 (discussing first AD statutes).
29. Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. 9, 11-15, repealed by
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 144, 193; see
Bryan & Boursereau, supra note 27, at 666 (noting that the Antidumping Act of 1921
introduced many of the concepts contained in current antidumping statutes). For instance, the 1921 Act included the use of injury determinations, purchase price,
exporter's sale price, and foreign market value. Id.; see also Michael S. Knoll, United
States Antidumping Law: The Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEXAS INT'L. LJ. 265,
269 (1987) [hereinafter Knoll, Reconsideration] (noting that the 1921 Act introduced
the bifurcated administrative process still in use today).
30. GATT, supra note 3.
31. GATT, supra note 3. The GATT Antidumping Code is a separate document.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Relating to Antidumping Measures), reprinted in H.R. Doc No. 96-153, Part 1,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1979); see Sandier, supra note 10, at 763 (discussing the
statutory authorization for antidumping laws). As a signatory, United States
antidumping laws are predicated on GATT. Id.
32. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 20134 (1994).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1671-72 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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and the ITC determines whether the dumping harms a United States industry. '
1. Generally Applicable United States Antidumping Law
As defined under United States AD law, dumping occurs when a
manufacturer charges a lower price in the United States market than in
the manufacturer's home market, or a third market, for the "same or
similar merchandise" after accounting for differences in sales conditions
and merchandise characteristics.' In cases involving market economies,
Commerce employs a standard methodology for determining a product's
FMV. First, Commerce determines whether a foreign manufacturer's
goods were sold in the United States for LTFV by comparing the United States price of the product with the FMV of such or similar merchandise in the firm's domestic market.' If the product is not sold or
offered for sale in the foreign firm's domestic market, Commerce identifies the price at which the product is sold or offered for sale in countries other than the United States.' Finally, if there are no sales in the
home market or to third countries, the statute authorizes Commerce to
utilize a "constructed value."3 If Commerce finds that dumping occurred, Commerce fixes the dumping margin by calculating the average
amount by which the FMV exceeds the price of the product in the
United States.39 The finding of dumping and the fixing of the dumping
margin establishes the first of the two prongs required to impose an AD

duty.
The ITC investigation, in turn, seeks to determine whether the
dumping caused, or threatens to cause, material injury' to a United
States industry. 4 The governing statutes direct the ITC to consider var-

34. Id.

35. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16) (defining "same or similar merchandise" as merchandise with identical physical characteristics); see also Knoll, Reconsideration, supra
note 29, at 267 (describing when dumping occurs); Boltuck, supra note 16, at 45-47
(same).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A).
37. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (stating that Commerce may look at sales in
third countries if sales in the firm's domestic market are too small for comparison).
38. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2) (defining the use of constructed value); 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1) (providing the method of calculating constructed value).

39. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1)(A).
40. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (stating that "[t]he term 'material injury' means
harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant").
41.

N. David Palmeter, Dumping Margins and Material Injury: The USITC Is
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ious factors in ascertaining whether there is "injury" to a United States
industry.42 A finding of "threatened injury" requires support by evidence that "the threat of material injury is real and that actual injury is
imminent" and "not merely based on conjecture or supposition."" Additionally, sufficient grounds to impose an AD duty exist if the ITC
determines that development of a United States industry may be materially retarded by foreign dumping."
Dumping investigations are difficult enough when they involve market
economies. However, as the following discussion illustrates, they become
much more complicated when the dumping investigation involves a
NME.
2. United States Antidumping Law Relating to NMEs
Application of United States AD statutes to NMEs pose unique problems, because by definition NMEs do not allocate resources according to
market concepts of supply and demand.45 The Antidumping Act of
1921 did not provide for a different dumping analysis in cases involving
NMEs.' Therefore, it was not until the 1960 case, Bicycles From
Czechoslovakia, that the Department of the Treasury47 (Treasury) announced a methodology for dealing with NMEs.' In Bicycles, home
Free to Choose, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 173-75 (1987) (commenting that the Commission has broad discretion in using dumping margins to determine injury).
42. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (stating that a preliminary determination of injury
may be found by reason of imports that materially retard United States industry); 19
U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (providing that imports or sales for import may be determinative
of injury in a final determination); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (Supp. 1993) (listing as dispositive factors volume, price, impact on affected domestic industry, cumulation, and
treatment of negligible imports).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(B); Certain Dried Salted Codfish from Canada, 7 INT'L
TRADE REP. DEC. 2353 (July 1985) (discussing "material retardation" of United States
industry by dumping practices).
45. Although when the author visited the Soviet Union in 1984, the manager of
a collective farm in Ukraine attempted to minimize the differences between capitalism
and communism by saying "Don't worry, we count the money here too."
46. Judith H. Bello et al., Searching for "Bubbles of Capitalism": Application of
the U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws to Reforming Nonmarket Economies, 25 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 665, 673 (1992).
47. Charles 0. Verrill Jr., Nonmarket Economy Dumping: New Directions in Fair
Value Analysis, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 427, 428 (1988) (arguing that
Treasury was responsible for determining the dumping margin prior to 1980 when the
task was given to the Department of Commerce).
48. Bicycles From Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 6,657 (Dep't Treas. 1960) (final
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market prices for the Czechoslovakian manufacturer were rejected because they failed to reflect market forces. '9 Because it was considered
impossible to determine the FMV of a NME manufacturer's product, it
was determined that a suitable surrogate country's prices and costs

would be substituted." Although Treasury had developed and refined
its methodology for conducting dumping investigations involving NMEs
in the early 1960s, Congress did not pass legislation codifying the administrative practice until the Trade Act of 1974.'
Despite the years

of administrative practice and the passage into law of a methodology for
dealing with NMEs, the surrogate methodology proved difficult to apply
because there were occasions when there was no available surrogate.
Therefore, it was necessary to devise an alternative methodology to use
when an appropriate surrogate could not be located.
In 1975, a dumping investigation involving Electric Golf Cars From
Poland required Treasury to come up with a new methodology for de-

termining the FMV of golf cars produced by a Polish manufacturer

2

In Golf Cars, Treasury adopted a method whereby the amount of each
factor input of the Polish manufacturer would be determined and the

cost of each factor input would be taken from a market economy country, in this case Spain, considered by Commerce to be at a comparable
stage of economic development.' This new methodology became
known as the "factors of production approach."' In the 1979 Trade

LTFV determination) [hereinafter Bicycles]; Bello et al., supra note 46, at 673;
Verrill, supra note 47, at 449-450.
49. Bicycles, supra note 48, at 6,657.
50. Id.; Verrill, supra note 47, at 428. Treasury determined that the home market
or export price of similar merchandise produced in surrogate market economies, or the
constructed value of the Czechoslovakian bicycles was the best means for determining
foreign market value. Id. Another influential case which established the methodology
for dumping investigations involving NMEs was Jalousie-Louvre-Sized Sheet Glass
from Czechoslovakia, 27 Fed. Reg. 8457 (Dep't Treas. 1962) (final LTFV determination).
51. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978, 2074 (amending Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14 § 205, 42 Stat. 9, 13).
52. Electric Golf Cars From Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497 (Dep't Treas. 1975)
(final LTFV determination) [hereinafter Golf Cars]. In Golf Cars. Treasury initially
relied on a Canadian producer as a surrogate. However, in the midst of the investigation the Canadian producer ceased production and Treasury was left without a means
of verifying the fair market value of the Polish manufacturer by reference to a market
economy manufacturer. Id.
53. Id.
54. Bello et al.,
supra note 46, at 674-76.
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Act, Congress included the factors of production approach as an alternative methodology to be used in NME cases where it was impossible to
find an appropriate surrogate.55
The surrogate country approach was severely criticized due to the
seemingly unpredictable and arbitrary dumping margins it produced
against NME manufacturers. 6 Additionally, Commerce was finding it
increasingly difficult to locate surrogates willing and able to provide
reliable price data.
Therefore, Congress was once again faced with
the necessity of revising United States AD statutes in order to find a
more effective method for dealing with NMEs.
In 1988, after considering several proposals for amending United
States AD law covering NMEs,"8 Congress incorporated new provisions
for NME countries within the 1988 Trade Act.59 The new provisions
in the 1988 Trade Act included the first definition of a NME contained
in section 771(18), codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18). Additionally, sec-

tion 771(18) provided that Commerce's determination that a country was
a NME country would not be judicially reviewable.'

55. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 776, 93 Stat. 144, 186
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677e). After passage of the 1979 Trade Act, the Commerce
Department issued regulation 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(a)-(c), outlining the hierarchy of
methods for determining the foreign market value in investigations involving NMEs.
The regulation provided that foreign market value should be determined:
(1) according to the home market prices of such or similar merchandise in a
surrogate country; (2) the export price of such or similar merchandise shipped
from a surrogate; (3) when actual or accurate prices are not available, the constructed value of such or similar merchandise in a surrogate country; and (4)
the value in a surrogate country of the factors of production used in the NME
for such or similar merchandise.
19 C.F.R. § 353.8(a)-(c).
56. Report of the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, Omnibus Trade Act of
1987, Report No. 100-71, June 17, 1987 at 108. S. Rep. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 108 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Report 1987]; see also Jeffrey S. Neeley,
Nonmarket Economy Import Regulation: From Bad to Worse, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 529, 534 (1989); Bello et al., supra note 46, at 680.
57. Senate Report 1987, supra note 56; see Verrill, supra note 47, at 450.
58. Neeley, supra note 56, at 537-540. Bello et al., supra note 46, at 680-683.
59. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (codified as amendments throughout Title 19 of the United States Code).
60. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18). Section 1677(18) provides:
(18) Nonmarket Economy Country(A) In General.-The term "nonmarket economy country" means any foreign country that the administering authority determines does not operate
on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of mer-
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The 1988 Trade Act also included a provision amending the methodologies for calculating the FMV for NME countries.!' However, the

chandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.
(B) Factors To Be Considered.-In making determinations under subparagraph (A) the administering authority shall take into account(i) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible into the currency of other countries,
(ii) the extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are determined by free bargaining between labor and management,
(iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of
other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign country,
(iv) the extent of government ownership or control of the means of
production,
(v) the extent of government control over the allocation of resources
and over the price and output decisions of enterprises, and
(vi) such other factors as the administering authority considers appropriate.
(C) Determination In EffecL[Subsection (C) states that a determination of NME status can be made
against any country at any time and will remain in effect until revoked.]
(D) Determination Not In Issue.-Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, any determination made by the administering authority under subparagraph (A) shall not be subject to judicial review in any investigation
conducted under subtitle B.

(E) Collection Of Information.[Subsection (E) requires the Commissioner of Customs to provide information concerning countries under review for a determination of NlE
status.]
Id.

61. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c); Neeley, supra note 56, at 540. Section 1677b(c)
provides:
(c) Nonmarket Economy Countries(l) In General.-If(A) the merchandise under investigation is exported from a nonmarket
economy country, and
(B) the administering authority finds that available information does not
permit the foreign market value of the merchandise to be determined
under subsection (a),
the administering authority shall determine the foreign market value of
the merchandise on the basis of the value of the factors of production
utilized in producing the merchandise and to which shall be added an
amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, coverings, and other expenses, as required by subsection (e). Except as provided in paragraph (2), the valuation of the factors of production shall be
based on the best available information regarding the values of such
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FMV methodologies under the 1988 Trade Act were similar to the 1979
Trade Act except that the factors of production approach replaced the
surrogate country method as the preferred method of calculating FMV

for a NME manufacturer.62 Different commentators have characterized
the 1988 Trade Act's changes in the FMV calculation as a "commendable achievement" or a "modest, almost marginal" change.63 Regardless
of the view one takes of the value of the changes made in the 1988
Trade Act, virtually everyone would agree that Commerce has had a
difficult time administering the current AD law in cases involving
NMEs in transition." The NME methodology under the 1988 Trade
Act produces unpredictable results which usually result in a higher
factors in a market country or countries considered to be appropriate to
the administering authority.
(2) Exception.-If the administering authority finds that the available information is inadequate for purposes of determining the foreign market
value of merchandise under paragraph (1), the administering authority
shall determine the foreign market value on the basis of the price at
which merchandise that is(A) comparable to the merchandise under investigation, and
(B) produced in one or more market economy countries that are at a
level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket
economy country,
is sold in other countries, including the United States.
(3) Factors of Production.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the factors of
production utilized in producing merchandise include, but are not limited
to(A) hours of labor required,
(B) quantities of raw materials employed,
(C) amounts of energy and other utilities consumed, and
(D) representative capital costs, including depreciation.
(4) Valuation of Factors of Production.-The administering authority, in
valuing factors of production under paragraph (1), shall utilize, to the
extent possible, the prices or costs of factors of production in one or
more market economy countries that are(A) at a level of economic development comparable to that of the
nonmarket economy country, and
(B) significant producers of comparable merchandise..
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c).
62. Id.
63. Compare Verrill, supra note 47, at 457 (supporting the change because the
new methodology is relatively predictable and based as much as possible on actual
information from the NME) with Bello et al., supra note 46, at 680. See also Neeley,
supra note 56, at 540.
64. See infra notes 193-252 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce's efforts at administering the AD law to NMEs in transition).
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dumping margin for NME products than would exist if any of the standard methodologies were applied.' However, the provisions of the
1988 Trade Act will continue to be the basis on which Commerce

makes determinations concerning NMEs in transition, because the provisions concerning NMEs in transition were not included within the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.'

3. Conclusion
The 1988 Trade Act requires Commerce to calculate the cost of goods

for NME manufacturers that do not operate in market economies with
market pricing systems. Despite the attempt to use costs from economies

at a similar state of economic development, costs are not transferrable
from one country to another. Each nation has a comparative advantage

in some factor of production. Manufacturers tend to use more of the
factors of production they have in abundance, with a relatively lower
cost, and less of those scarce factors carrying a relatively higher cost. 67

65.- Carey et al., Transitional Relief for Russia Under the U.S. Trade Laws: New
Policies for Assisting Russia's Entry into U.S. and Global Markets, U.S.-RUSSIA BUSINESS CouNciL (Prepared by Steptoe and Johnson) (undated), sec. 1, at 3 (discussing
NME methodologies); see also James K. Kearney & Jim Wang, The Department of
Commerce's Market-Oriented Industry Methodology for Nonmarket Economies in
Antidumping Investigations: The Responding Party's Perspective, in THE COmeRCE
DEPARTMENT SPEAKS
INvESTmENT ABROAD,

1992: DEVELOPMENTS IN IMPORT ADmISTRATION; EXPORT AND
at 255, 266-67 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Handbook Series

No. 789, 1992), available in Westlaw, JLR database. As Carey, Cunningham & Abbey state:
This special NME Methodology [19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)] yields unpredictable and
unfair results--to the detriment of both Russia and U.S. industry-because: (1)
the selection of the surrogate country is inherently arbitrary; (2) the dumping
calculation in practice relies heavily on inaccurate and unfavorable "best information available" data (usually proffered by the U.S. petitioners), used to punish the [Russian Federation] government for their inability to provide actual
data....
Carey et al., supra, sec. 1, at 3.
66. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text (discussing the failure to include
provisions regarding economies in transition in the final GAT implementing legislation); infra notes 254-73 and accompanying text (providing a substantive discussion of
the proposed treatment of NMEs in transition).
67. MIT DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 183-184 (describing the Heckscher-Ohlin
approach to international trade). For instance, assume Ukraine has an abundant supply
of cheap labor and that Norway has a scarcity of labor. If manufacturers in both
countries are producing textiles, the Ukrainian manufacturer will use a greater amount
of laborers, while the Norwegian manufacturer will use more automation and fewer
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Therefore, taking the factor input figures from a NME country, and
combining them with the costs of those inputs from a market economy
country with a different cost structure, produces higher dumping margins
than would exist under any of the methodologies for determining FMV
in a market economy. The same problem exists when Commerce uses
the surrogate country approach. Placing artificially high antidumping
duties on goods from NME in transition manufacturers will inhibit their
ability to sell goods to the United States and earn dollars. Reducing the
access of NME in transition manufacturers to the United States market
will harm the process of market reform, because successful implementation of many of the market reforms requires economy in transition countries to export products to earn Western currency.
Since 1988, market reforms in NME countries have made it more
difficult for Commerce to administer the NME provisions of the 1988
Trade Act. One of the reasons for the difficulty in administering the AD
law relating to NMEs is that the NMEs are in a state of transition from
communist systems to various forms of market economies. Each NME
country in transition is pursuing market reforms according to its particular social, political, and economic situation. Although former NME
countries are pursuing market reforms in different ways, Commerce must
cope with NMEs in transition within the framework of the outdated
NME provisions contained within the 1988 Trade Act. Commerce, using
its administrative discretion, has addressed this problem by devising new
methods to determine the point at which NME in transition sourced
factor input prices sufficiently reflect market forces for inclusion in the
FMV calculation. Despite its best efforts, Commerce has not found a
satisfactory solution to the problem of factor pricing in economies in
transition that is consistent with the theory behind United States AD
law.
Another reason why Commerce is having difficulty with the changes
occurring in NMEs is the relationship between the use of United States
AD law and CVD law in situations involving NMEs in transition. Use
of the CVD law in cases involving economy in transition manufacturers
must be interpreted in light of Commerce's decision, upheld by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, making the CVD
law inapplicable to NMEs. To fully appreciate the impact of
Commerce's decision not to apply the CVD law to NMEs, it is important to understand the economics of subsidies and the treatment of subsidies under United States law.

laborers to produce similar products.
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II. THE ECONOMICS OF SUBSIDIES AND UNITED
STATES COUNTERVAILING DUTY STATUTES
As the following discussion illustrates, the AD and CVD laws are
administered similarly. For instance, United States CVD law requires
Commerce to determine whether a subsidy has been paid. In addition,
where required, the 1TC is responsible for determining whether injury,
the threat of injury, or material retardation of a United States industry,
has resulted from the importation of subsidized products. However, before discussing the administration of United States CVD law, it is important to understand the theoretical debate concerning the scope and
purpose of United States subsidies law.

A. THE ECONOMICS OF SUBSIDIES
In economic terms, a subsidy is defined as a "[p]ayment by the government (or possibly some private individuals) which forms a wedge between the price consumers pay and the costs incurred by producers,
such that price is less than marginal cost. ' Subsidies are used to
transfer societal wealth to a particular class, to influence the supply or
demand for a particular good, and most commonly, to complement a
price stabilization program.' Classical economic theory holds that subsidies distort the market outcome that would have occurred absent the
subsidy, thereby creating inefficiencies in resource allocation which
lower global welfare." Because subsidies provide a benefit to the man-

68. MiT DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 413.
69. Id. Such reasons include:
(1) a transfer from taxpayers to producers or consumers of a particular good,

for example, in order to raise farmers' incomes, (2) to influence behavior of
suppliers or demanders via the mechanism of elasticity of supply or demand,
for example, in the case of an external economy, (3) to keep prices of certain
goods low or stable, for example, as part of an anti-inflation policy.
Id.
70. See Garten, supra note 16, at 9-10 (quoting JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI. PROTECTIONISM (1988)). Mr. Garten quotes Mr. Bhagwati as writingIf one applies the logic of efficiency to the allocation of activity among all
trading nations, and not merely within one's own nation state, it is easy enough
to see that it yields the prescription of free trade everywhere . ... If any
nation uses tariffs or subsidies (protection or promotion) to drive a wedge between market prices and social costs rather than to close a gap arising from
market failure, then surely that is not consonant with an efficient world allocation of activity. The rule then emerges that free trade must apply to all.
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ufacturers from one country that competing manufacturers from other
countries do not receive, the subsidized manufacturers can compete more

effectively in an export or domestic market."
If the subsidized goods are sold only in the subsidized manufacturer's
domestic market or a third country's market, United States CVD law
cannot counteract the effects of the subsidy.' In markets where United
States manufacturers compete with the subsidized product, they will lose
sales as a result of the foreign government subsidizing its manufacturer.73 If, however, the subsidized products are sold in the United States,
and injury to the United States industry has occurred, a CVD may be
placed on the foreign product as it enters the country. 4
Even though the United States adopted its first CVD statute over 100
years ago,75 a debate persists as to the theoretical underpinnings which
should guide the administration of United States CVD law. Two apparently competing theories have emerged to explain the purpose of these
laws.76 First, the deterrence theory holds that CVDs will deter govern.. . The trade regime that one constructs must then rule out artificial comparative advantage arising from interventions such as subsidies and protection.
Id. (emphasis added).
71. ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 22 (1991) (citing to STATE PAPERS AND SPEECHES ON THE TARIFF 275 (F.W. Taussig ed., 1892)). Mr. Reich notes
that, while speaking about tariffs, Abraham Lincoln said:
I do not much know about the tariff, but I know this much, when we buy
manufactured goods abroad we get the goods and the foreigner gets the money.
When we buy the manufactured goods at home we get both the goods and the
money.
Id. As it applies to buying subsidized products from abroad, Lincoln's statement
would need little modification: when we buy subsidized products from abroad, we get
the goods, but inefficient foreign producers get the money and inefficient foreign
workers get the jobs. When we buy nonsubsidized goods, on the other hand, we get
the goods, and efficient firms and workers wherever located get the money and the
jobs.
72. See Richard Diamond, Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law, 29
VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 781-82 (1989) (discussing the application of United States CVD
laws).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See infra notes 103-20 and accompanying text (providing a historical overview of United States CVD laws).
76. See Charles J. Goetz et al., The Meaning of "Subsidy" and "Injury" in the
Countervailing Duty Law, 6 INT'L RV. LAW & ECON. 17, 19-20 (1986) (comparing
the deterrence theory, which seeks to dissuade foreign firms from accepting subsidies,
and the neutralization theory, which accepts the existence of subsidies); Diamond,
supra note 72, at 778 (same).
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ments from granting subsidies because they deny a foreign government
or firm the benefits resulting from the subsidy.7 However, the deter-

rence theory has received criticism for failing to account for situations
where market externalities7 result in an allocation of resources which

are not socially desirable. 9 Externalities occur where no market exists,
in areas such as police, fire, and public education, or where there is an
inability of markets to define and enforce property rights.' In such

cases, subsidies provide a needed boost to the production of a product
that society values, but which is not produced in sufficient quantity in

the marketplace.'
The argument that the deterrence theory of the CVD law does not ac-

count for externalities fails to address whether it is proper for government to interfere in the marketplace by granting subsidies to address
certain externalities. First, pursuant to United States CVD law, chal-

lenged products must operate within established markets and be the
beneficiaries of specific government subsidies.' According to the spec-

77. See Goetz et al., supra note 76, at 19-20 (discussing the deterrence theory);
Diamond, supra note 72, at 778 (same).
78. MiT DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 146 (defining "externalities"). The dictionary defines externalities as:
. . . an interdependence of utility and/or production functions .... A beneficial externality, known as an external economy is, where an extenmality-generating activity raises the production or utility of the externally-affected party.
For example, a beekeeper may benefit neighboring farmers by incidentally supplying pollination services. An external diseconomy is where the externalitygenerating activity lowers the production or utility of the externally-affected party. Examples of these are the numerous forms of environmental pollution.
l
79. See WILIM J.BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECoNOMICS 539-43 (3d ed.)
(analyzing how externalities operate in the economy).
80. See id. at 542-43 (describing the phenomenon of externalities); MIT DIcTIONARY, supra note 14, at 146 (defining "externalities").
81. See Diamond, supra note 72, at 778-79 (discussing the use of subsidies). Professor Diamond writes:
. . . [the] conceptual difficulty arises [in the deterrence rationale] because the
efficient economic equilibrium assumed to exist absent subsidization is at times
subject to externalities. When an externality leads to a market price which does
not fully capture the social value of the product, the firm will produce less
than the efficient quantity of the good. In such cases, the proper government
subsidy on the production of the good will result in a distortion, but in a more
efficient outcome than would have existed without the subsidy. [footnote omitted]
Id.
82. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5). In defining a subsidy, the statute provides in pertinent
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ificity requirement, general government involvement to improve the lives

of its citizens by providing public services does not trigger application
of CVDs. 3
The failure to grant subsidies to domestic firms or industries does not
necessarily preclude fostering economic competitiveness, addressing
social problems, or stimulating production of particular products considered socially useful. Governments have alternative means at their
disposal, such as a tax policy, to regulate economic activity within their
borders." Moreover, nations disagree over what policies should be followed in pursuit of social welfare, and it is not the function of the CVD
law to distinguish the "social value" of various products. What is clear
is that when governments provide subsidies to specific firms or industries in order to enhance a country's social welfare, investment and
production patterns in other countries are affected and the world as a
whole fails to maximize its production potential." Therefore, countries

part:
(ii) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or

industries, whether publicly or privately owned and whether paid or bestowed
directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of any class or
kind of merchandise: ...
Id. (emphasis added).
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
Article 2, incorporates the specificity requirement. Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Part I, Art. 2.
83. See Richard Diamond, A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in
the Administration of United States Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L

Bus. 507, 518 (1990) [hereinafter Diamond, Search] (describing governmental actions
and countervailing duties). As Professor Diamond explains:
In modern society, all producers benefit from government action. Governments
regularly provide road systems, police and fire protection, and other services
which the producer would otherwise have to provide for itself. If such governmental actions were countervailable, virtually every product in international trade
could be subject to a levy, a result which contrasts with accomplishments under
GATT. To avoid this result, some test is generally applied which exempts from
countervailing duties government actions which provide general benefits, rather
than benefits to a few specific industries or firms.
Id.

84. See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 79, at 543 (discussing the implications
of imposing a tax to offset externalities).
85. See GARTEN, supra note 16, at 10. Although Mr. Garten was addressing the
impact of dumping, it is equally true that subsidies send false signals to the market
by creating a disincentive for investors to invest capital in manufacturers that are in
competition with the subsidized manufacturer.
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should be allowed to use their CVD laws to deter subsidies, thereby

promoting the efficient utilization of resources on a global scale.'
The second argument against deterrence theory is that GATI agreements regarding subsidies and countervailing measures recognize the so-

cial usefulness of subsidies, and do not prohibit subsidies." It is disingenuous to rely on the premise that GATT members recognize the use-

fulness of government involvement in the economy to bolster the argument that deterrence theory is unsound with respect to subsidies to spe-

cific firms or industries. The signatories to GATT subsidies agreements
acknowledge that subsidies can distort and inhibit international trade to
the detriment of all countries." Otherwise, the signatories would not

have negotiated for the countervailability of subsidies in the first instance, nor recognized that to permit indiscriminate government subsidi-

zation of specific industries would invite "beggar thy neighbor" policies
which export unemployment and other social problems." GATr mem-

bers also recognize that it is politically impossible to eliminate subsidies
completely.' However, the failure to prohibit subsidies completely under GATT is not inconsistent with the deterrence theory. Rather, GATr
members have agreed to permit individual countries to place CVDs on

86. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing the economics of
subsidies).
87. See Diamond, supra note 72, at 779. As Professor Diamond states:
The deterrence rationale is also inconsistent with current international agreements. The GAIT Subsidies Code, for example, rejects claims that all such
payments are per se improper, while recognizing their potential for harming
some individuals. [Article then quotes from Subsidies Code Article 11].
Id.
88. AGREEiENT ON INTERPREATION AND APPLiCATION OF AaRmc.s VI, XVI,
AND XXII OF THE GENERAL AGREENENT ON TARImn AND TRADE, done Apr. 12,
1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter GATT SuSIDmES CODE].
89. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measure, Apr. 15,
1994, at art. 5-7, in Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, Texts of Agreements, Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action, and Required Supporting Statements,
HR. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1319 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on
Subsidies] (providing multilateral CVD remedies such as consultations and convening
a dispute settlement body). These remedies intend to address subsidies that cause
"serious prejudice" to the trade interests of other members such as the practice of
displacing or impeding the exports of like products of a member into a third country
market Id.
90. Id.
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goods imported from countries granting subsidies to specific firms or
industries.9 '
The second theory, the neutralization or entitlement rationale, holds
that deterrence is not the purpose of United States CVD law.' Rather,
United States CVD law should apply only to the extent that the granting
of a subsidy results in foreign firms selling goods in the United States
in greater quantity, or at lower cost.' Therefore, under the neutralization rationale, countervailing duties should apply only to the extent
necessary to ensure that United States firms receive the result they were
"entitled" to absent the foreign subsidy.94 In the vast majority of cases,
the neutralization approach produces a lower countervailable subsidy
than the deterrent approach.95 However, it remains to be determined

91. Id.
92. See Goetz et al., supra note 76, at 20 (noting that, under the neutralization
theory, a CVD serves to neutralize 'relevant' effects of the subsidy on the subsidized
firm in the form of altering its behavior).
93. See id. at 23 (discussing adverse competitive impact on United States industry). As stated by the authors:
In general, a necessary condition for adverse competitive impact on American
producers is that the subsidy is output-increasing for the subsidized firm. In
particular, the legitimate focus of concern is because a subsidy either directly or
indirectly causes a foreign firm's variable costs of producing goods for sale in
the American market to be lower.
Id. Professor Diamond further argues that:
. . . [Wlhile the reduction of marginal cost is a necessary condition for the
imposition of a countervailing duty, it is not a sufficient condition. Under certain market conditions, the entitlement of U.S. producers is not affected even
when government payments lower a foreign firm's marginal cost curve and the
imposition of a duty is not warranted.
Diamond, supra note 72, at 777.
94. See Goetz et al., supra note 76, at 18-19 (discussing the use of countervailing duties). As stated by the authors:
We assume that American firms are entitled to that domestic market outcome
which would have resulted from a 'fair', competitive process, by which is
meant one which has not been 'manipulated' by foreign government subsidization. The idea then is to restore competition in the American market to its 'but
for' state by neutralizing the effect of the subsidy.
Id. Professor Diamond concludes that:
. . . U.S. countervailing duty law should entitle [U.S. firms] to an outcome
which limits the direct impact of the subsidized foreign firms in the U.S. market-that is, its impact as a direct seller in that market- to what it would have
been had the government subsidy not been available.
Diamond, supra note 72, at 782.
95. Goetz et al., supra note 76, at 25 (describing variable costs and subsidy
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whether the difference in measurement of the CVD under the neutralization approach makes it fundamentally different than the deterrence approach.
Many theoreticians use the neutralization rationale to describe the
purpose of United States CVD law, but the deterrence theory dominates
the enforcement process.' The deterrence theory supports the imposition of United States CVDs in many situations where the neutralization
rationale would not.' Furthermore, it has been argued that in cases
involving nonmarket economies or those rare occasions where there are
a fixed amount of resources relative to demand, that government activity
will not distort the market.98 However, in cases where the neutralization
grants). There, the authors note that the impact on the variable cost, as the neutralization theory suggests, would result in sitbations where a foreign government would
provide a subsidy to a specific firm or industry without the payments affecting the
firm's variable costs. Id Professor Diamond cites three examples of these situations
as:
[1] when a government grant does not require a change in the behavior
of the firm or when it results in a change of behavior which does not affect
production. Subsidies which require no change in behavior may occur if the
subsidy is intended simply as a transfer of benefits to owners of the firm.
Other examples are government payments provided to cover operating losses, to
decommission unused facilities, to help in the clean-up of existing company
wastes, or to pay vested retirement allowances, if the payments were unanticipated.
* ..
[2] that of the firm which would have performed the activity required to
receive government funds even if the funds had not been offered (by the government].
.. . [3] payments which equal the additional cost to the firm of the behavior
necessary to qualify for the payment. An example would be a government
stipend to pay the wages of employees whom, for social reasons, the government requires the company to hire, but who do not participate in production.
Diamond, supra note 72, at 786-88.
96. See Goetz et al., supra note 76, at 20-25 (noting explanations as to why the
enforcement process is dominated by the deterrent approach to deny all benefits of a
subsidy). The authors state:
The benefit-oriented approach is, however, easier to implement than the costbased approach in one fundamental respect the causal link between receipt of
the benefit and the firm's behavior in the American market need never be
examined.
Id.
97. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing when a subsidy
would not be countervailable under the neutralization approach).
98. The argument that a government activity did not produce market-distorting
effects was successfully made to a United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Article 1904 Binational Panel. See In The Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products
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From Canada, 1993 WL 549652 (U.S.Can.F.T.A.Binat.Panel). In this case, two binational panels were involved. The first panel remanded the case back to the United
States Commerce Department ordering Commerce to consider the price and output
effect of alleged subsidies existing within the Canadian government's provincial
stumpage fee programs, and to consider whether these programs were in fact marketdistorting. Id. at 24.
On remand, the second binational panel summarized the situations where government activity may not affect production as follows:
There may of course be circumstances where this presumption of market distortion will not apply, either because there is no relevant competitive market
against which distortion can be measured (the case of nonmarket economies) or
because of the special characteristic(s) of the market in question. In these
exceptional cases, the economic theory that underlies countervailability is inoperable, and as a matter of U.S. law, no countervailable subsidy exists.
Id. at 24; see infra notes 140-70 and accompanying text (discussing the two schools
of thought on the applicability of United States CVD laws to NMEs).
The panel summarized the arguments of the Canadian complainants as follows:
From the outset the Canadian Complainants have maintained that the provincial
stumpage markets constitute one of these exceptional cases. They rely on classical Ricardian rent theory, which applies with respect to natural resources for
which there is a basically fixed supply and strictly limited alternative uses. According to rent theory, there will be a range of prices for a resource (the 'normal range') over which output will remain constant. Within the normal range, a
reduction in price will not increase use of the resource.
Id.
After remanding the case so that Commerce could consider whether Canadian
stumpage policy had a market-distorting effect, Commerce adopted the:
'Marginal cost theory'. . . [standing] for the proposition that fewer trees will be
harvested where an increase in stumpage fees results in a higher marginal cost
for stumpage uses. Commerce views this theory as more in conformity with the
real world of stumpage markets than economic rent theory. According to Commerce, marginal cost theory sustains the conclusion that Canadian stumpage
programs create a distortion in normal competitive markets, i.e. that these programs result in a greater output of timber and lower log prices than would
exist in a normal competitive market.
Id. at 28.
After reviewing the substance of the analysis under the Ricardian rent theory
and the marginal cost theory, the panel determined:
. . . assuming (as we ought) the accuracy and rigor of [Commerce's] sources,
they simply do not contradict the basic insight of rent theory on the question
of the effects of stumpage pricing on the output and price of timber and lumber. . . We are not here, however, faced with two competing theories, because.
. . 'the rent theory approach is not opposed to the supply-demand model.'
Instead we are faced with two complementary and interrelated approaches to
resource markets, neither of which provide support for Commerce's conclusion
that where lower stumpage prices exist in an administered system, output will
be increased beyond the level that otherwise prevail in a normal competitive
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theory would countervail a subsidy in order to ensure United states
firms receive the outcome they are entitled to in the United States mar-

ket, it is consistent with the principles of deterrence theory." Therefore,
the differences between the deterrence and neutralization approaches relate to determining whether, and by how much, to countervail a subsidy.

Once a CVD is imposed, the intended outcome under either the deterrence or neutralization approaches is to prevent foreign subsidization

from having an effect in the United States market. Eventually, the foreign government will cease providing, or the foreign producer will re-

fuse to accept, the subsidy.
By counteracting and deterring specific subsidies, CVDs promote

actions by foreign governments and firms that are consistent with the
provisions of GATT. While the United States acting alone may not
influence the behavior of a foreign government or firm to end a subsi-

dy, the cumulative effect of several nations imposing CVDs on a subsidized product could bring an end to the subsidy. Despite the differences
in defining or measuring a countervailable subsidy, the imposition of
CVDs serves the interest of global efficiency by denying governments
and firms the benefits of subsidy programs."

In addition to the controversy over the theoretical foundations of
United States CVD law, there are questions concerning whether NME
governments are capable of providing countervailable subsidies. 0' If it
market.
Id at 29.
Although the binational panel determined that the Canadian provincial stumpage
program did not distort the softwood lumber market, the terms of the economic analysis underlying the decision and the wording of the decision itself indicate that this
was an exceptional case. Therefore, its dubious whether economic rationale of the
Softwood Lumber case would apply in other situations.
99. Goetz et aL., supra note 76, at 22 (acknowledging that, in some situations,
these theories are consistent). The authors explain:
Presumably, some subset of subsidies which would have been accepted if fiums
could make sales in the American market resulting from subsidy-induced reductions in the costs of producing goods for that market will instead be declined if
this possibility is foreclosed by the imposition of a countervailing duty offsetting the subsidy-induced reductions in cost. Thus implementing the neutralization
rationale has deterrent consequences on foreign subsidization ...

Id (emphasis added).
100. See infra note 315 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence and coercion
as they relate to attempts to prompt NME governments to cease subsidizing inefficient
enterprises).
101. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (discussing the theoretical basis
for CVDs on NMEs).
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is determined that subsidies cannot exist within a NME, United States
CVD law cannot be used to promote the efficient use of resources in
NME countries. 2 However, before discussing United States CVD law
as applied to NMEs, it is necessary to review the generally applicable
provisions of United States CVD law.
B.

OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES

CVD

LAW

In 1890, the United States Congress promulgated the first CVD statute
to protect United States sugar producers from unfair payment of a subsidy by foreign governments to their respective domestic sugar producers."° The 1890 Act was intended to protect United States sugar producers from the unfair trading practices of sugar producers in nations
that "pay, directly or indirectly, a [greater] bounty on the exportation of'
refined sugar.' Later, in the Tariff Act of 189405 and the Tariff Act
of 1897,"° Congress made CVDs available against all foreign products
receiving a bounty or grant"° from a foreign government.'
Concepts
contained in the Tariff Act of 1897 were contained in section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930,"°9 which remained part of United States CVD law
even after the adoption of GATT."I However, section 303 was recently repealed by provisions of the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act."'
Additionally, provisions of United States CVD law are based on United
States obligations arising under GATT."2
The first GATT Subsidies Code (Subsidies Code)," 3 was negotiated
during the Tokyo Round, as a separate interpretation of the subsidy

102. See infra notes 140-69 and accompanying text (explaining the two schools of
thought).
103. Tariff Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244 § 237, 26 Stat. 567, 584.

104. Id.; see Zenith Radio Corporation v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 451 (1978)
(discussing the origin of the CVD in the Tariff Act of 1890).

105. Tariff Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 509 ch. 349.
106. Tariff Act of 1897, 30 Stat. 151, ch. 11.
107. See Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 39 (1919) (stating that "a
word of broader significance than 'grant' could not have been used").
108. See Zenith, 437 U.S. at 452 (discussing the evolution of the imposition of
CVDs under the Tariff Act of 1894 and the Tariff Act of 1897).
109. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. 1994).
110. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.

111. See H.R. REP. No. 826, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 261 (1994) (noting that the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act repeals section 303).
112. See Diamond, supra note 72, at 771 (discussing the conformance of United
States CVD legislation with GAI.
113. GATT SuBsiDIEs CODE, supra note 88, at art. II, 1-2.
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provisions contained in GATT, as opposed to an addition to, or
amendment of, GATT itself."4 There were two reasons for negotiating
the Subsidies Code as a "stand alone" agreement applicable only to
those countries signing the Subsidies Code or voluntarily undertaking the
obligations contained in the Subsidies Code. First, the Western industri-

alized countries recognized that an agreement further restricting the use
of subsidies would not gain the support of developing nations." 5 Second, the United States Congress believed that the negotiation of a separate agreement would create an incentive for all parties seeking the
benefits of the agreement to grant concessions at the negotiating table." 6 Previously, countries could "free-ride" by passively accepting

the benefits of an agreement which had general applicability negotiated
between the major trading nations." 7 However, application of the Subsidies Code to some, but not all GATT members, was at odds with the
basic premise of GATT, namely the unconditional most favored nation
(MFN) clause of Art 1.
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, consistent with the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, alters
United States CVD law by repealing section 303 of the 1930 Tariff
Act." 9 Although section 303 was repealed, the Uruguay Round Agree-

ments Act provides that countries which did not sign the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures are

not entitled to an injury determination.'

Therefore, it is unclear

114. SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE OF THE SENATE COM. OF FINANCE, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter FINANCE SUBCOMTrrE]; see
Walter KoUigs, Note, The United States Law of Countervailing Duties and Federal
Agency Procurement After the Tokyo Round: Is It "GATT Legal"?, 23 CORNELL INT'L
LJ. 553, 554 (1990) (noting that the Tokyo Round negotiations constitute "stand
alone" treaties independent of GATT).
115. Kolligs, supra note 114, at 555.
116. Id.
117. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 77-78 (1974) [hereinafter REPORT
ON TRADE ACt OF 1974] (discussing the tendency of developing countries to accept
agreements passively without undertaking domestic reform).
118. GATT, supra note 3, art. 1. The relevant portion of Article 1 states that:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind... any advantage,
favor, or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties.
Id.
119. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 32, at § 261.
120. See id.at § 262(c) (defining countries not entitled to an injury determina-
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whether the treatment of NMEs in transition under United States CVD
law would change due to the repeal of section 303. Because it is unclear how the Uruguay Round Agreements Act altered the treatment of
NMEs in transition under United States CVD law, it is necessary to
trace the development of United States CVD law and the treatment of
NMEs under that law.
1. Generally Applicable Provisions of United States CVD Law
Until the passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the United
States maintained two sets of substantive provisions for administering
United States CVD law. The first provision was section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1303, and the second substantive provision was codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 et. seq. Despite
the division of United States CVD law into two sets of statutes, the
modem term "subsidy" contained in section 1671 was interpreted to
have exactly the same meaning as the term "bounty" or "grant" under
section 303.1' The difference between section 303 and section 1671
related to the requirement of finding injury to a United States industry
before imposing a CVD.'
The grandfather provisions in GATT's implementing document, the
Protocol of Provisional Application, permitted continued use of section
303." Since section 303 was based on the 1897 Act, rather than the
Subsidies Code, no injury determination was required before imposition
of a CVD.1 ' However, the countries undertaking the obligations of the
Subsidies Code were entitled to an injury test pursuant to section
1671.'" If it was determined that NME countries, or countries with
economies in transition, were subject to United States CVD law, they
would fall under the provisions of section 303 because the United States

tion); id. at § 262(d) (defining a subsidies agreement country).
121. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5); see David Simon, Can GATT Export Subsidy Standards
Be Ignored by the United States in Imposing Countervailing Duties?, 5 J. INT'L. L.
Bus. 183, 185 (1983) (discussing the definition of "subsidy" under the two relevant
statutory sections).
122. Simon, supra note 121, at 185-86.
123. PROTOCOL OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
308 [hereinafter PPA]; Kolligs, supra note 114, at 567.
124. See Roasted In-Shell Pistachios From Iran, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,679 (Dep't
Comm. 1986) (final CVD determination) (stating that under section 303, petitioners do
not have to allege material injury).
125. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b).
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applied the injury determination on a conditional MFN basis only to
those countries accepting the obligations imposed by the Subsidies
Code."z With the repeal of section 303, United States CVD law will
continue to be administered on a conditional MFN basis, but now in
accordance with the provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act. 1
The decision to repeal section 303 and administer United States CVD
law based on the Uruguay Round Agreements Act will affect a NME or
economy in transition country if two conditions are met: 1) if the country in question is a Subsidy Agreement country as provided in section
262(b) of the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act; and 2) the country's
government is capable of providing a subsidy. Determining whether a
country is a Subsidies Agreement country under section 262(b) should
not be difficult. In the past, however, disagreement has existed over
whether a NME country government can grant a subsidy. Historically,
the impact of section 303 with its lack of an injury determination may
,have played a role in Commerce's position that governments in NMEs
cannot grant subsidies. With the repeal of section 303, and while NMEs
are in a state of transition, it may be time to revisit the question of the
applicability of United States CVD laws to NMEs and economy in
transition countries.
2. United States CVD Law Relating to NMEs
There are two schools of thought as to whether governments of
NMEs can grant subsidies." One school argues that it is possible for
governments of NMEs to grant subsidies, but that locating and measuring the subsidy necessitates the application of a nontraditional subsidy
analysis. 29 This school argues that a subsidy should be analyzed in
terms of "preferential treatment" rather than a benefit provided by the

126. 19 U.S.C. § 1303; see Robert L. Harris, Note, Goin' Down the Road Feeling
Bad: U.S. Trade Laws' Discriminatory Treatment of the East European Economies in
Transition to Capitalism, 31 COLuMI. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 422-23 (1993) (stating
that NMEs could not receive the benefit of the test for material injury because not
one NME is a signatory to the GATT Subsidies Code).
127. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 32, at §§ 261, 262(b), 262(c).
128. See Gary N. Horlick & Shannon S. Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and
U.S. AntidumpinglCountervailing Duty Laws, 18 I r'L L 807, 829 (1984) (describing
the two approaches to granting countervailable duties in NME countries).
129. Id.
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government. 31 Under the "preferential treatment" analysis, if the government provides preferential treatment to one group or industry, that
preference is countervailable.13 ' Application of United States CVD law
under this analysis requires Commerce to establish the normal or average price levels within a country, and then determine whether the group
or industry in question received any preferential treatment. 32 This
analysis can be applied to measure the degree of preferential treatment
received by one group or industry in either a market or nonmarket economy.

133

The difficulty with this analysis is that it fails to deal with subsidies
embedded in a NME's normal or average price levels. Therefore, a
group or industry could be the beneficiary of government involvement in
setting the economy's normal or average price levels without incurring
CVD liability. For Commerce to identify a countervailable subsidy, it
would have to find a second level of government preference for that
group or industry beyond that normally found throughout the economy.
Under this approach, a great deal of government subsidization would not
be countervailable.
The second school argues that it is impossible for a NME government
to grant a countervailable subsidy.' Proponents of this theory acknowledge that government action distorts the allocation of resources
within the economy. However, this theory asserts that because the subsidies pervade the economy, it is impossible to isolate and quantify a
subsidy for purposes of applying the CVD law. 35 In CVD cases involving market economies, Commerce relies on commercial benchmarks
for establishing the standard against which to measure the amount of a
subsidy. 36 By contrast, commercial benchmarks are impossible to find
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Horlick & Shuman, supra note 128, at 829. Horlick and Shuman write:
This definition of subsidy hinges on the concept of preferentiality: if the government treats a group specially (to that group's benefit) a subsidy is conveyed.
The approach could be characterized as follows: If a subsidy is thought of in
economic terms as a governmental action such that one group benefits relatively
more than others in a country, a countervailable subsidy exists to the extent
that the level of benefit to the targeted recipient exceeds the normal or average
level of benefit. This can be done in a market as well as nonmarket context as
long as the average is measurable.
Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (explaining that benchmarks represent the normal or average commercial
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when the public sector owns the means of production and there is no
private sector as exist in market economy nations.'" However, Commerce finds it theoretically consistent to utilize commercial prices from
market economies in determining a NME manufacturer's FMV in cases
under United States AD law.'
This issue is discussed in greater de39
tail below.
The two schools of thought concerning the applicability of United
States CVD laws to NMEs were addressed in Georgetown Steel
Corp."4 There, the United States Court of International Trade (Cm, in
a sharply-worded opinion, overruled Commerce's final determinations in
several combined CVD cases involving NMEs."' As stated by the
CIT, Commerce presented four reasons for concluding that United States
CVD law does not apply to NMEs."' However, only two of the stated
reasons are relevant to this analysis."'

situation as found by the average business community).
137. Id. Horlick and Shuman write:
The United States countervailing duty law relies on the existence of commercial
benchmarks to determine when a subsidy exists (i.e., a countervailed subsidy
occurs when a government behaves in a way that is more beneficial to the
recipient than the same commercial action based upon unrestrained market forces). Where, as in a NME, there are no significant commercial benchmarks,
there is no commercial standard against which to compare the government intervention. Therefore, lacking a market-based norm, it is impossible to determine
if a producer or exporter is receiving a subsidy and, if so, how to measure it.
Id.

138. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (explaining how the "factors of
production" approach uses cost of input factors of market economies to determine
FMV in NMEs).
139. See infra notes 221-52 and accompanying text (describing Commerce's current
approach to calculating FMV under the factors of production methodology).
140. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp 548, 550 (C. Int'l
Trade 1985), rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1303

(Fed. Cir. 1986).
141. Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (Dep't
Comm. 1984) (final neg. CVD determination); Carbon Steel \'ire Rod From Poland,
49 Fed. Reg. 19,374 (Dep't Comm. 1984) (final neg. CVD determination); Potassium
Chloride From the Soviet Union, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (Dep't Comm. 1984) (rescission of initiation of CVD investigation).
142. Continental, 614 F. Supp. at 549-50.
143. See id. at 549-50 (listing the reasons for the CIT's decision). The two reasons not relevant to this analysis are that Commerce relied on "the consensus" of the
academic literature in the area, and, that Commerce asserted broad discretion in determining whether subsidies exist. Id.
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First, Commerce determined that section 303 did not apply to NMEs
because Congress was silent on the application of United States CVD

law to NMEs while at the same time specifically amending United
States AD law to cover NMEs.'" Therefore, argued Commerce, Con-

gress must not have intended United States CVD law to apply to
NMEs. 45 Commerce buttressed its argument by citing to Article 15 of
the Subsidies Code, which permits signatories to treat NMEs under their
AD law or their CVD law."4 Commerce interpreted Congress'
amendment of United States AD statutes in the 1979 Trade Act as an
expression of Congressional preference that United States AD law govern the treatment of NMEEs.' 4 Furthermore, Commerce believed that it
was unfair to use section 303 to deprive NMEs of the benefits of an
injury determination. 48
The CIT, determining that section 303 applied to NMEs, stated that
"[t]he language of the law [is] so abundantly clear and its purpose so
obvious" that the statute applied to "any country."' 49 The CIT interpreted Article 15 as expressly permitting application of the CVD law
against NME countries, and found that the amendments to the United

144. Id. at 549-50.
145. Id. at 549-50.
146. Id. at 556.

147. Continental, 614 F. Supp. at 556. The CIT wrote:
The government has made an argument, difficult to follow, that Congressional
approval of the Subsidies Code in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, somehow
indicated a choice of antidumping law rather than the countervailing duty law
for use with products from nonmarket economies. This argument evidently takes
the continuation of special provision for nonmarket economies in the
antidumping law (previously shown here to be nothing more than a ratification
of past administrative practice) as a sign that Congress had rejected the countervailing duty law for use with nonmarket economies. (footnotes omitted)
Id.

148. Id. at 556. The CIT wrote:
* * * the government injects the novel idea that had Congress not rejected the
countervailing duty law it would have given petitioners a way to avoid the
injury test of the antidumping law-as if the governments of countries with

nonmarket economies have a vested interest in getting the procedure of an
injury determination before their products could be assessed with special duties.
Id. (emphasis added).

149. Id. at 550 (recalling that, in dealing with arguable NMEs such as Czarist
Russia and Nazi Germany, the Treasury Department had no difficulty in applying the
CVD law). The court concluded "[these latest determinations are new developments
by the administrative agency. In short, they have no weight of historical administrative practice behind them." Id. at 555-56.
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States AD law constituted nothing more than a codification of prior
administrative practice as announced in Bicycles and Golf Cars, rather

than a congressional preference for use of the AD law."

Because

countries with NMEs participated in negotiating the Subsidies Code, the
CIT found that those countries as well as Congress acknowledged the
applicability of CVDs to NMEs."' Finally, the CIT noted there was no

legal reason to prefer the use of a methodology which would allow
NMEs to obtain an injury determination before assessing duties against
their products."

Secondly, the CIT addressed the theoretical principles governing the
administration of United States CVD law to NMFs. Commerce had

maintained that because no market exists in NMEs, it was impossible
for a NME government to grant a subsidy.'

Commerce argued that

the absence of a market indicated the absence of commercial
benchmarks necessary for Commerce to determine the amount of the
subsidy conferred by the government."
However, the CIT disagreed by finding that subsidies could be grant-

ed by NME governments despite the absence of a market or commercial
benchmarks. 5' The CIT's decision reflected the "preferential treatment"
approach to subsidies, wherein a government of a NME can convey a

subsidy by bestowing special treatment on a particular firm or industry
even in the absence of markets or commercial benchmarks."

The CIT

150. Id. at 556; see supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text (discussing Bicycles

and Golf Cars).
151. Continental, 614 F. Supp. at 556-57. The CIT writes:
Article 15 of the [Subsidies] Code clearly gives a country the choice of using
subsidy law or antidumping law for imports from a country with a state-controlled economy. Moreover, Congress was informed that countries with
nonmarket economies had participated in the preparation of the Code and that it
had been signed, subject to subsequent ratification, by two such countries.
...In the opinion of the Court this constitutes overwhelming evidence that
the 1979 Act shows a definite understanding by Congress that the countervailing duty law covers countries with nonmarket economies.
Id. at 556-57.
152. Id. at 556. The CIT concluded that" ... the Commerce Department's determinations were contrary to law. To allow it to develop such an extraordinary exception to the law would go beyond deference to an administrative agency. It would be
an abdication of judicial responsibility." Id. at 557.
153. Id. at 549.
154. Id.
155.

Id. at 552-55.

156. Continental, 614 F. Supp. at 553. The CIT explained that:
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found that an opposite conclusion would exempt from section 303 regu-

lation those governments most guilty of providing subsidies." 7
Although the CIT declined to specify a methodology for determining
the subsidy amount, the court stated that the problem Commerce faced
was not whether section 303 applied, but rather. how to measure the
amount of the subsidy.'58 The CIT noted that Commerce had no
theoretical difficulty in determining FMV for NME manufacturers under
United States AD law without the use of domestic commercial benchmarks.'59 Moreover, under the CIT-favored preferential treatment approach, it would be easier for Commerce to determine the amount of a
subsidy than to determine a dumping margin based on a surrogate market economy." Therefore, the court concluded that the AD law created "a far greater problem" for nonmarket economies than the CVD
6
law.1 1
Although the CIT clearly stated that the CVD law is not "a tool of
foreign policy,"' 62 the reasoning behind Commerce's original negative
Subsidization in one of its purest forms is the encouragement of exportation by
means of some type of special preference.
* ..The Commerce Department cannot say that such a preference is impossible in a nonmarket economy. It can only say that distortions of a 'market'
are not possible. That may be true but it does not eliminate the possibility of
subsidization.
Id.
157. Id. at 553. The CIT writes:

The Commerce Department's reasoning suggests the absurd result that the more
completely a government becomes involved in production and the more thoroughly it eliminates the possibility of internal reference to 'market,' in short,
the more perfectly it insulates production from normal economic reality, the less
likely it is to be 'subsidizing.'
Id.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 553.
Continental, 614 F. Supp. at 555.

162. Id. at 553. In Georgetown Steel, Commerce argued that the purpose of United States CVD law was consistent with the deterrence theory for countervailing subsidies. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The

CIT disapproved of Commerce's view, however, that the purpose of United States
CVD law was to deter a distortion of the market, a misallocation of resources, and a
reduction in world wealth. Id. The CIT went so far as to say that Commerce's statement regarding the purpose of the United States CVD law was an attempt at "influencing the way the wealth of the world is developed." Id. Finally, the court endorsed
something approximating the neutralization theory of United States CVDs when it
stated that the purpose of the United States law was to protect domestic producers.
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final CVD determination was based, in part, on foreign policy considerations to avoid a conflict with NME governments over the imposition of
CVDs without an injury test.
In Georgetown Steel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) reversed the CIT and reinstated Commerce's origi-

nal determination concerning subsidies and NMEs.'

The CAFC

agreed with Commerce that section 303, as a direct descendent of the

1897 Act, was not intended to address NMEs.6 The CAFC based its
decision on a finding that Article 15 of the Subsidies Code provided
Congress with a choice of enforcing unfair trade remedies against NMEs

through either the AD law or the CVD law." The CAFC felt that by
providing remedies against NMEs in the AD law Congress had expressed its desire to pursue enforcement of United States unfair trade
remedies against NMEs through the AD law rather than the CVD

law.

16

Id.
163. Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1309, 1314. The CAFC statedBased upon the purpose of the countervailing duty law, the nature of nonmarket
economies and the actions Congress has taken in other statutes that specifically
address the question of exports from those economies, we conclude that the
economic incentives and benefits that (nonmarket economies] have provided for
the export .
do not constitute bounties or grants under section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.
Id.
164. Id. at 1309, 1314.
165. Id. at 1317-18. The CAFC wrote:
Article 15 of the Subsidies Code permitted signatory countries to regulate imports from State-controlled economies based on a surrogate cost methodology
under either antidumping or countervailing duty legislation enacted in the particular signatory country.
• . . Since the Subsidies Code was the product of the joint agreement among
a number of countries, which had varying laws dealing with selling at unreasonably low prices by foreign producers, it was only natural that the Code
would merely prescribe the method for determining the existence of a subsidy,
and leave it to each country to determine the particular method it would use to
deal with the problem.
Id.
166. Id. The CAFC went on to state:
In the United States, as we have held, Congress elected to deal with the problem under the antidumping and not under the countervailing duty law. The fact
that Congress adopted the Code under which the United States also could have
proceeded under the countervailing duty law, does not establish that in fact it
did so.
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In rejecting the CIT's adoption of the preferential theory of subsidies,
the CAFC agreed with Commerce that, where no market exists, a government cannot distort resource allocation through subsidization. 67 Unlike the CIT, the CAFC failed to acknowledge that application of United
States AD law rather than section 303 would grant NMEs manufacturers
the benefits of an injury determination.'68 The CAFC decision and
Commerce's position resulted in a curious situation where GATT members with market economies that had not undertaken the Subsidies Code
obligations were not entitled to an injury determination, while NME
countries which were not GATT members received the benefit of an
injury determination.'69 The position of Commerce and the CAFC that
NMEs cannot provide subsidies remains an open debate, especially after
the repeal of section 303 and the emergence of more NME countries
seeking to implement market reforms.
3.

Conclusion

Neither the view of Commerce, upheld by the CAFC, nor the opinion
of the CIT which was reversed, are completely satisfactory. Commerce
and the CAFC advanced the rationale that subsidies cannot exist in a
nation where the government owns every facet of production, mandates
the level of production for all major goods and services, sets costs and
prices throughout the economy, and ensures that inefficient producers
will not go out of business. This view suggests that a little subsidization
will invoke the CVD law, while a substantial amount of subsidization
will not invoke such duties.
Article 15 of the Subsidies Code permits the application of a
signatory's AD or CVD law to NMEs. For market economy signatories
of the Subsidies Code, both AD or CVD laws would require an injury
determination, so the issue of inconsistent treatment does not arise.
However, section 303 remained applicable due to the grandfather provi167. Id. at 1315-16. The CAFC stated that:
Although, these benefits [provided by the government to producers in a NME]
may encourage these entities to accomplish the economic goals and objectives
of the central planners set for them . . . they do not create the kind of unfair
competitive advantage over American firms against which the countervailing
duty act was directed.
Id.
168. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (noting CIT criticism of providing NMEs with an injury determination).
169. This result leads to an interesting MEN status problem which could be adjudicated under the GATT dispute resolution as a violation by the United States.
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sions of the PPA. Congress' decision to amend the AD law to conform
to the previous administrative practice, and not to amend the CVD law,
did not foreclose the application of United States CVD law to NMs.
By its terms, section 303 applied to "any country," and precedent existed for using section 303 against nonmarket economies such as Tsarist
Russia and Nazi Germany. Therefore, the Georgetown Steel decision,
which declined to apply section 303 in NME cases, created a curious
result: NMEs gained the benefit of an injury test while GATT members,
not taking on the obligations of the Subsidies Code, received no injury
test. This decision was inconsistent with, if not a violation of, United
States MFN obligations under GATT because United States trade laws
treated imports from GATT members not covered by the Subsidies Code
less well than imports from NMEs.
The CIT's statutory analysis of section 303, and its finding that governments in NMEs can provide subsidies, is more consistent with the
theory underlying United States CVD law than the view taken by Commerce and the CAFC. However, the concept of preferential treatment
within a NME as the basis for countervailing a NME governmental
subsidy requires closer scrutiny. The use of United States CVD law not
only protects domestic industry from the harmful effects of subsidized
competition, but it also fosters the efficient allocation of resources
throughout the global economy. Under the preferential treatment approach, government control of an economy resulting in a misallocation
of resources is acceptable; but if the government takes a second step to
show further preferential treatment to a manufacturer, then a CVD may
be assessed. This approach fails to countervail all of the subsidy.
The distinction between the deterrence and neutralization theories is
mostly an argument over how to measure a subsidy correctly. Subsidies
are an anathema to the goals of free trade underlying GATT and United
States trade policy. Countervailing subsidies deny manufacturers receiving the subsidy any advantage in the United States market, and, to that
extent, deter governments of those manufacturers from subsidizing products intended for sale in the United States. Therefore, even though United States CVD statutes, or the legislative history, fail to state expressly
that United States CVD law is premised on deterrence theory, the imposition of United States CVDs has a deterrent effect.
With the replacement of section 303 by section 262 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, United States GATT obligations require an injury test before a countervailing duty for all Subsidy Agreement countries, regardless of whether they are NMEs or economies in transition.
Therefore, in light of the changes in United States CVD law and the
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market reforms introduced in NME countries, the Georgetown Steel
decision requires a reexamination. The introduction of market reforms in
NMEs has created an opportunity to utilize United States AD law in
conjunction with the CVD law. 70 Furthermore, using United States AD
and CVD laws together will assist NME governments in carrying out reforms necessary to transform successfully from state-controlled NMEs to
market-oriented economies.
Before discussing ways to coordinate United States AD and CVD
laws in cases involving NMEs in transition, the nature of the economic
transition underway in these countries requires understanding. This article will also review the attempts Commerce has made to cope with
NMEs in transition under the provisions of the 1988 Trade Act. The
final section will analyze several proposals for dealing with NMEs in
transition.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF NMEs IN TRANSITION
AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
RESPONSE BY COMMERCE
Since the 1980s, many countries traditionally identified as NMEs have
pursued policies designed to introduce market reforms into their economies. These market reforms forced Commerce to reconsider its treatment
of NMEs in transition under United States AD and CVD laws. A series
of AD and CVD cases involving PRC manufacturers required Commerce
to develop new approaches for administering United States unfair trade
laws in cases involving economies in transition. The first attempt at
administering the AD and CVD laws in cases involving economies in
transition manufacturers resulted in the "bubbles of capitalism" approach.' However, within a short period of time, Commerce replaced
the bubbles approach with the more restrictive "market oriented industry" approach." Before discussing the details of Commerce's attempts
to administer the AD and CVD laws to manufacturers operating within
economies in transition countries, this article will consider the economic
steps these countries must take in order to transform successfully into
market oriented economies.

170. See infra notes 329-30 and accompanying text (arguing that Commerce should
utilize the CVD law in conjunction with the AD law).
171. See infra notes 196-220 and accompanying text (examining the "bubbles of
capitalism" approach used by Commerce in administering the AD and CVD laws).
172. See infra notes 221-49 and accompanying text (describing the "market-oriented industry" approach used by Commerce in administering the AD and CVD laws).
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A. THE ECONOMICS OF NMEs IN TRANSMON

While the PRC slowly began introducing market reforms in the early
1980s,'" only in the last several years have the NME countries of Europe begun to address the legacy of their communist past by instituting
market reforms.' Although market reforms are proceeding, economists
have yet to reach a consensus regarding the optimal speed and sequencing the reforms should take. "5 Furthermore, economists disagree over
the appropriate level of government involvement in the transition process." 6 Despite these differences about the pace of reform, economists

173. See Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu, The M-form Hierarchy and China's
Economic Reform 37 EuR. ECON. REV. 541 (1993) (noting that from 1979 to 1991,
market reforms have yielded substantial growth).
174. Philippe Aghion, Economic Reform in Eastern Europe, Can Theory Help? 37
EuR. ECON. REv. 525 (1993); Peter Murrell and Yijiang Wang, /hen Privatization
Should Be Delayed: The Effect of Communist Legacies on Organizationaland Institutional Reforms, 17 J. COMP. ECON. 385, 386 n.2 (1993). Murrell and Wang state:
We define a communist economy in terms of its fundamental feature: the dominance of the state sector guaranteed both by favorable resource allocation and
by systematic legal restrictions on private ownership. Once the major legal
restrictions to the development of the private sector are abolished, an economy
is no longer communist and has started its transition. By this criterion, countries
like China are no longer communist, but rather transitional economies, despite
the presence of a large state sector. By the same criterion, the Hungarian and
Polish economies of the mid-1980s were still communist, despite significant reform efforts and a more tolerant policy toward the private sector. Final elimination of the major legal barriers on the private sector occurred in 1988 in
Hungary and in 1989 in Poland.
Id.
175. Aghion, supra note 174, at 525.
176. Id. at 525-26; Jeffrey Sachs & David Lipton, Poland's Economic Reform, 69
FOREIGN ArE. 47 (1990); PROMOTING DaiOCRAcY AND FREE MARKERS IN EASTERN
EUROPE (Charles Wolf, Jr. ed., 1991) [hereinafter Wolf]; cf. Edward J. Green, Privatization, the Entrepreneurial Sector, and Growth in Post-Comecon Economies 17 J.
COMP. ECON. 407 (1993). In fact, Green's thesis provides in part that
(1) The Soviet system of production has been more efficient than is commonly
recognized. The benefits from dismantling this system abruptly by privatizing its
constituent enterprises may not exceed the costs.
(2) Soviet planning procedures, which primarily operated via planning ministries
at the industry level rather than from within enterprises, were not dramatically
different from the planning procedures that have risen within some industries in
market economies. In some industries, at least, relocating planning to the enterprise level is likely to be counter-productive.
Id. at 408.
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widely agree about the necessary steps to move NMEs toward more
market-oriented systems.
Economists have identified the necessary steps for a successful transformation from NMEs to more market-oriented economies. These steps
fall under six headings: 1) monetary reform to control the money supply
and stop inflation; 2) fiscal control to limit budget deficits and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies; 3) price and wage deregulation to
link supply and demand within the economy; 4) privatization, including
legal protection of property rights, and antitrust laws to break up former
state monopolies; 5) a social "safety net" to assure social stability during
disruptions caused by the transition; and 6) freely convertible currency
to foster the integration of the economy in transition with international
markets and to encourage international trade.'" The effectiveness of
these steps depends on the willingness of the governments to enact them
as part of a comprehensive package of reforms.' If these reform measures are not adopted in toto, the beneficial effects of each individual
reform measure is lost.'79 For example, the unemployment resulting
from policies of freely convertible currency and increased foreign trade
requires a social "safety net" to prevent political upheaval.' Although
the domestic consequences of the transition process will be different in
each country, only the general benefits arising from increased international trade require discussion in this article.
An open trading policy provides three benefits to the economic development of economies in transition. First, increased trade, coupled with a
freely convertible currency, is essential for efficient resource allocation
within the economy in transition. 8' The need for greater efficiency is
created because the establishment of a convertible currency links the
cost of a country's domestic production with the rest of the world,
allowing comparative advantage to dictate the allocation of resources
within the transitional economy.'82 Second, competitive pressures reduce the monopoly inefficiencies present in large state-owned enterprises
within the economy. 8 Ultimately, the price effects of foreign trade
177. II THE TRANSMON TO MARKET ECONOMY at 44 (Paul Marer & Salvatore
Zecchini eds., 1993) [hereinafter Marer & Zecchini]; Wolf, supra note 176, at 8-10;
Sachs & Lipton, supra note 176, at 55.
178. Wolf, supra note 176, at 8.
179.

Id.

180. Id. at 9.
181. Marer & Zecchini, supra note 177, at 270; Wolf, supra note 176, at 9;
Sachs & Lipton, supra note 176, at 54.
182. Wolf, supra note 176, at 9-10; Sachs & Lipton, supra note 176, at 54.
183. Marer & Zecchini, supra note 176, at 270; Klaus Werner, Russia's Foreign
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assist the economy in transition in stabilizing prices because foreign
trade introduces international cost and pricing standards into the econo-

my.'

Finally, increased foreign trade promotes greater efficiency

through the introduction of foreign investment, technology, and import

competition.'" Despite general agreement among economists regarding
the necessity for, and benefits of, market reforms and free trade in promoting long term stability and growth in economy in transition countries, these countries have yet to reap fully the rewards resulting from
market reforms."u
Initially, economists believed that the economies in transition would
experience what is known as a "J-curve. ' "' Economists predicted that
Trade and the Economic Reforms, INTEECONOMICS, May/June 1993, at 144-45.
Werner states:
[In Russia the] old, monopolistic structures continue to predominate, it has only
been possible to establish properly functioning capital, goods and labor markets
in exceptional cases, and factors of production are largely immobile ..... The
price signals issuing from external markets are distorted or suppressed, and thus
cannot trigger off the response from enterprises which would normally be expected in a market economy.
Werner, supra, at 144-45.
184. Werner, supra note 183, at 145.
185. Marer & Zecchini, supra note 177, at 270.
186. David Rohde, A New Curtain Rises Behind Ex-Iron Curtain, CHRISTIAN SOl.
MoNrrOR, Feb. 27, 1995, at 6. The article states:
Five years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, a new 'cultural curtain' is descending on East Europe. Instability and underdevelopment, some financial analysts warn, will now divide tens of millions where ideology divided them in
the past.
On one side, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic could successfully
complete the transition to free-market economies and gain entrance to the European Union and NATO.
But Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Russia, and most former Soviet republics
may continue to suffer through years of political instability and economic underdevelopment reminiscent of the third world. (emphasis added).
Id.
187. Charles Wyplosz, After the Honeymoon, On the Economics and the Politics of
Economic Transformation, 37 Eut. ECON. REv. 379 (1993). A J-curve exists when:
In the period immediately following a Depreciation or Devaluation of its currency a country may experience a Balance of Payments deficit. In the subsequent period however this will be eliminated and the current account slowly
moves into surplus. ... In explanation of these events it is usually argued
that the volume of Exports and Imports respond only slowly to the change in
relative prices that the devaluation has introduced and therefore imports remain
high and exports low in the immediate post-devaluation period ....
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after a short period of recession, the economy in transition countries of
Europe would experience rapid growth, catching up with Western Europe within two decades.'88 Unfortunately, after enacting policies
geared towards stimulating market reforms and economic growth, most
economy in transition countries are experiencing worse than anticipated
unemployment, inflation, budget deficits, and falling production. 89 As
a result of these unexpectedly harsh conditions, public support for politicians supporting market reform policies has declined. 9° Electoral set-

MIT DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 224.
188. Wyplosz, supra note 187, at 379.
189. Id.; John E. Elliott and Abu F. Dowlah, Transition Crises in the Post-Soviet
Era, 27 J. ECON. IsSUES 527 (1993). The drastic devaluation of the Russian ruble in
October 1994 demonstrates the volatility of the economic picture in Central and
Eastern Europe. Margaret Shapiro, Ruble Plunges to New Low, Of Nearly 4,000 to a
Dollar, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1994, at A29. The article stated:
The Russian ruble lost more than 25 percent of its value today, tumbling into a
free fall that is severely challenging government assertions that Russia's troubled
economy has finally entered a period of tentative stability.
. . . The battered currency fell from 3,081 rubles to the U.S. dollar to 3,926
on the official Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange. Since the beginning of
October, the ruble has lost nearly half its value.
Id.; see Margaret Shapiro, Yeltsin Fires Finance Minister Over Ruble Fall; Currency
Makes Slight Recovery, But Consumer Anxiety Continues, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1994,
at A27 [hereinafter Yeltsin Fires Finance Minister]. The Post reports:
Economists said the main reason for the ruble's plunge was a series of government decisions this summer to loosen the budgetary strings and grant new
credits to agriculture and the military. Those actions sent people scurrying to
unload rubles and buy dollars as a hedge against inflation. The inflation rate
crept up in September to 7.7 percent [per month] and is expected to worsen
this month.
The ruble's drop has challenged government assertions that the turmoil of the
past few years is mostly over and that Russia has achieved a measure of economic stability.
Yeltsin Fires Finance Minister, supra, at A27.
190. Shapiro, Yeltsin Fires Finance Minister, supra note 189, at A27. Yeltsin faces
several political consequences to Russian reform efforts:
.. . Yeltsin, responding to the dramatic free fall this week of the Russian
ruble, fired his finance minister today and demanded that parliament dismiss the
head of the Russian Central Bank.
As Russia's monetary crisis threatened to turn into a serious political
crisis for Yeltsin, the Russian leader moved to distance himself and his policies
from the turmoil. He suggested that the ruble's collapse may have been orchestrated as an international act of 'sabotage,' and he appointed a special commission, headed by the director of the former KGB, to investigate.
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backs of supporters of reform in countries such as Lithuania, Poland,
Hungary, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Russia, are evidence of the diminishing
public confidence in market reform policies.' Due to the economic
hardships experienced in the economy in transition countries, there is
political pressure in the West to provide economic assistance to these
countries, especially Russia.'" Against this social, political, and eco-

Russia's parliament, dominated by legislators who oppose Yeltsin's policies, signaled it would use this crisis to increase pressure on the government by
scheduling a no-confidence vote for Oct. 21.
Ld.
191. Jane Perlez, Welcome Back Lenin, N.Y. TiMEs, May 31, 1994. at Al. A9. A
survey of results in several Central and Eastern European Countries shows a steady
erosion of support for reformers and a return to power for Communists by means of
the ballot box. ld. The Tunes reported that:
Soon after the Berlin Wall tumbled . . . the talk in diplomatic salons was that
Eastern Europe would join the European Community within a few years . ..
These expectations were not met . . . [and] the new leaders soon started
to be replaced by old faces . . .
Within two years Lithuania voted former Communists back into power.
Poland followed in 1993. In Ukraine, ex-Communists did well in recent parliamentary elections. And now, in the most staggering turn of all. Hungary
handed Parliament over to the old Communists.
Id. at Al; see David B. Ottaway, Socialists Win in Hungary, WASH. POST, May 8,
1994, at Al (reporting that the Hungarian Socialist Party won nearly 33% of Parliament while the Democratic Forum, a reform party, only won 12%); The Road to
Ruin, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 23 (detailing the failure of reforms and the political misfortunes of reformers); Fred Hiatt, Voters in Ukraine, Belarus Oust Their
Leaders, WASH. POST, July 12, 1994, at Al (describing the reinvigorated Communist
voting alliance resulting from the economic hardships of post-Soviet democracy);
Belarus Votes to Go Back to the Future, WASH. POST, May 16, 1994, at A14 (pointing to the reasons for the defeat of political reformers).
192. The Road to Ruin, supra note 191, at 23. The article states:
Harvard Professor Jeffrey Sachs, who resigned as an advisor to the Russian
government, condemns the West and particularly the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) [for setback's in Russia's reform policies]. The purpose of aid to
Russia, insists Mr. Sachs, should be political: to keep reformers in power. The
West failed to support the reformers and lost them.
Id. (emphasis added).
On September 28, 1994, the United States and Russia entered into a Partnership for Economic Progress, establishing a framework for expanding bilateral trade
between the two nations. OFFICE oF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE VHn-E HousE,
U.S.-RussIA STATEMENT ON PARTNERSHIP FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS, SEvr. 28, 1994
[hereinafter PARTNERSHIP FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS].
Russia will receive many benefits from this partnership:
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nomic backdrop, Commerce has struggled over the past several years to
develop an approach for administering United States unfair trade laws in
cases involving countries with economies in transition.
B. COMMERCE'S RESPONSE TO NMEs IN TRANSITION
Despite the fundamental economic transition occurring in the PRC and
NME countries of Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union,
Congress has yet to define an economy in transition under United States
unfair trade laws, or provide statutory guidance for Commerce to follow
in administering the AD and CVD laws in cases involving economy in
transition manufacturers. 93 Within the framework of the 1988 Trade
Act, only Poland is credited with completing the transition from a NME
to a market economy.' Because Congress has not provided statutory
Major investments by U.S. companies in such areas as energy production and
conservation, pharmaceutical and medical products, food processing, and the
conversion of defense production to production of goods for civilian consumption will boost Russian living standards and help spur Russia's progress toward
a viable market democracy and a full global partnership in peaceful commerce.
. . . Through the Joint Statement, Russia commits itself to continued marketoriented reforms creating a hospitable environment for doing business. The United States, in turn, commits to supporting Russia's reforms and facilitating Russian industry and export market development.
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHrrE HOUSE, FACT SHEET ON PARTNERSHIP
FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS,

Sept. 28, 1994, at 1-2 (emphasis added).

193. See Susan H. Kuhbach, L'Etat, Ce N'Est Pas Moi, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1992: DEVELOPMENTS IN IMPORT ADMINISTRATION; EXPORT AND
INVESTmENT ABROAD, at 169 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 789, 1992), available in WESTLAW, JLR database (describing the Commerce
Department's position regarding investigations of trade from nonmarket economy countries). Kuhbach notes the early history of the Commerce Department's investigations:
The possibility of singling out a particular sector or industry and finding it to
be market-oriented despite the fact that the larger economy was not marketoriented arose as early as the 1980 antidumping duty investigation of natural
menthol from the People's Republic of China [as determined at 46 Fed. Reg.
24,614].
Id. at 172.
194. Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Poland, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,205
(Dep't Comm. 1993) (final LTFV determination). The Commerce Department determined that:
Poland is no longer an NME country within the meaning of section [1677(18)]
of the Act. Although Poland has not yet achieved its objective of complete
political and economic integration with the European Community, [Commerce]
finds that Poland's domestic markets, unlike those of a traditional nonmarket
economy, are open to trade and foreign investment and are not insulated or

1995]

NONMARKET ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION

1037

guidance, Commerce has used its discretionary authority to develop approaches for administering the AD and CVD laws in cases involving
NMEs in transition. '

protected from external market influences.. . . [Commerce] finds that Poland's
economy operates on the basis of market principles to such an extent that Polish domestic prices can reasonably be used as a basis for calculating fair market value within the meaning of the U.S. antidumping law.
Id. at 37,206-07. Commerce went on to provide nine reasons for its decision that
Poland was no longer an NME:
(1) The zioty is convertible into other currencies, including the U.S. dollar. (2)
• . . Wages and work conditions are subject to collective bargaining between
the management of Polish enterprises and union representatives. (3) Poland has
a long history of permitting foreign direct investment. . . (4) Under Polish law,
the management of State-owned enterprises makes independent decisions in all
business matters. . . (5) Poland has eliminated price controls on virtually all
producer and consumer goods. . . (6) There are no restrictions on exports, except for weapons, goods in short supply, and products that have potential military uses. (7) [Poland's antimonopoly law aims] to create conditions under
which fair competition is ensured. (8) Poland has a securities exchange. . . (9)
[Poland's customs law and antidumping law follow GATT].
Id. at 37,206. Interestingly, reasons one, two, four, five, six, and seven match the requirements that economists believe are required for NMEs to implement market reforms successfully. Specifically, reasons one and six match the requirement of a freely
convertible currency to foster the integration of the economies in transition with international markets and encourage trade; reasons two and five match the need for price
and wage deregulation to link supply and demand within the economy; and reasons
four and seven coincide with the economic requirement of privatization, including
legal protection of property rights, and antitrust laws to break up former states monopolies.
Yet, even Poland voted former Communists back into power. Perlez, supra note
191, at Al.
195. Sparklers From the People's Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,588 (Dep't
Comm. 1991) (final LTFV determination) [hereinafter Sparklers]; Uranium From
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (prelim. LTFV
determination), and Uranium From Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelarus, Georgia, Moldova
and Turkmenistan (prelim. determination of sales not LTFV), 57 Fed. Reg. 23380
(Dep't Comm. 1992) [hereinafter Uranium]. The Commerce Department stated that:
[Tihe former USSR was a nonmarket economy country during the POI [Period
of Investigation] . . . . [A]ny determination that a foreign country is an NME
shall remain in effect until revoked. This presumption covers a geographic area,
each part of which assumes the previous NME character in the event of dissolution.
Uranium, supra, at 23,383; see also Ferrosilicon From Kazakhstan and Ukraine (final
LTFV determination), and Ferrosilicon From the Russian Federation (postponement of
final determination), 58 Fed. Reg. 13,050, 13,052 (Dep't Comm. 1993) (concluding
that Kazakhstan and Ukraine maintain their NME status).
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1. The Bubbles of Capitalism Approach
The first approach adopted by Commerce, the bubbles of capitalism
approach, evolved during AD investigations involving manufacturers
from the PRC.'" Although the PRC's economy was continually viewed
as a NME from a macroeconomic perspective, Commerce recognized
that sectors within the PRC were operating under market principles."9
Therefore, Commerce announced that in calculating FMV under the
factors of production methodology it would include the cost of factor inputs purchased under market conditions, whether they were foreign or
PRC sourced, and obtain from surrogate countries the remaining factor
inputs for costs that were not market-driven.' 98 The origins of the bubbles approach is traceable to an AD investigation involving Fans From
the PRC.'" In the case of Fans, the Chinese representatives argued
that market forces were at work in the PRC's economy, and therefore,
Commerce should have calculated FMV as though the oscillating and
ceiling fan industry was market-driven.2" The Chinese manufacturers
requested that the calculation of FMV proceed under the standard methodology of reviewing either home market prices, third country prices, or
constructed values, rather than under the factors of production methodology . " Commerce's response was that absent a showing that all costs

196. Kearney & Wang, supra note 65, at 266-67.
197. Id.; see Sparklers, supra note 195, at 20,589 (concluding that the PRC is still
treated as a NME).
198. The methodology adopted by Commerce was commonly known as "bubbles
of capitalism" but was also known as "mix and match" or "sectoral analysis."
199. Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans From the People's Republic of China, 56
Fed. Reg. 25,664, 25,667 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (prelim. LTFV determination) [hereinafter Preliminary Fans]; David W. Richardson & Robert E. Nielsen, Recent Developments in the Treatment of Nonmarket Economies Under the ADICVD Laws, in THE
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1992: DEVELOPMENTS IN IMPORT ADMINISTRATION;
EXPORT AND INVESTMENT ABROAD, at 149 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 789, 1992), available in WESTLAW, JLR database; Bello et al.,
supra note 46, at 695-96.
200. Preliminary Fans, supra note 199, at 25,666. Generally, the Chinese manufacturers argued that: 1) their respective companies were either privately owned or
foreign owned; 2) most of their inputs were purchased from market economies, and
the factor inputs purchased within China were purchased at arms-length and reflected
market prices; 3) the Chinese government had no control over the type or volume of
production; 4) the fans were sold outside of China; and 5) the labor and capital used
in production were free of government distortion and reflected market conditions. Id.
201. Id.
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and prices were market-driven, FMV must be based on the factors of
production methodology, using appropriate surrogates to provide prices
for factor input costs that were not market-driven.? However, Commerce provided that where a NME proved that factor inputs were purchased from market economies, Commerce would value them at the
purchase price3 Furthermore, Commerce announced that if a NME
manufacturer could show that factor inputs purchased within the NME
reflected market conditions, those NME sourced inputs would replace
surrogate country prices in calculating FMV.' If the entire industry
could show that costs for all factor inputs were set in the marketplace,
Commerce would use the reported market prices in calculating FMV.3
Commerce stated that it would wait until the final determination before
ultimately verifying whether the factor input prices were market-oriented.' During the interval between the preliminary and final determinations in the Fans case, Commerce began reevaluating the bubbles approach in another case involving the PRC.
In Lug Nuts From the PRC,' Commerce refined and restricted the
bubbles approach.3 Commerce continued to use the cost of PRC
sourced factor inputs determined by market forces, combined with surrogate country prices for factor inputs that were not market-driven.
However, Commerce began reexamining the theoretical underpinnings of
the bubbles appfoach by questioning whether bubbles of capitalism
within an otherwise NME was common or merely an "exceptional
event."2 '° On the other hand, Commerce continued to acknowledge that

202. See id. at 25,667 (stating that the Commerce Department preliminarily found

that not all inputs were market-based); Bello et al., supra note 46, at 693 (noting that
"significant inputs" like labor and overhead are addressed to determine fair market
value of products in state-controlled markets); Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 198,
at 157-59 (describing how Commerce modified the bubbles of capitalism approach by
evaluating only those inputs of NMEs that are demonstrably market-driven and by
using surrogate market economy country values to assess remaining central government influences).
203. Preliminary Fans, supra note 199, at 25,667.
204. Id.
205.
206.
207.
46,153
208.
ism").
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Chrome Plated Lug Nuts From the People's Republic of China. 56 Fed. Reg.
(Dep't Comm. 1991) (final LTFV determination) [hereinafter Final Lug Nuts).
See id. at 46,154 (noting that Commerce frust used term "bubble of capitalId.
Id. Commerce used the following example to show the difficulties in having
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the use of surrogate country prices for factor inputs with market-driven
prices would not serve the goals of accuracy, fairness, and predictability.211

In Final Lug Nuts, Commerce determined that the cost of steel and
chemical factor inputs purchased within the PRC had overcome the presumption of state price controls.2 2 For the first time, Commerce found
that factor inputs purchased within a NME could reflect market forces
and be used to calculate FMV under the factors of production approach.
However, Commerce's decision that PRC sourced factor inputs prices
were market-driven created unintended consequences for potential liability under section 303 of United States CVD law. The potential CVD
liability caused13Commerce to reverse itself in the final determination of
2'
the Fans case.
As a result of adopting the bubbles of capitalism approach, the same
United States petitioners who had originally argued against including
market-driven prices for PRC sourced input factors because the PRC

a true bubble of capitalism within a NME:
For example, an individual producer of chrome-plated lug nuts may be outside
of direct government control in the sense that inputs are purchased outside the
plan, management is selected by workers, and decisions on what to produce and
sell, and what prices to charge are left to the producing entity. Nevertheless,
this freedom from direct control occurs in an environment where the domestic
currency is not fully convertible, a portion of basic industrial output is produced for the state at state-controlled prices, and most trade is still carried out
through trading companies which only recently have begun to separate from
national, central-government-owned trading companies.
Id.
211. Id. Commerce addressed the issue of congressional intent under the AD laws
by stating:
With the individual factor input methodology described above, we believe that
we are addressing the paramount concern expressed by Congress for not using
NME prices to determine FMV, while at the same time recognizing that a
NME country that is undergoing a transition to a market-oriented economy may
contain sectors within its overall economic structure where market forces have
already come into play. When the Department is able to verify the existence of
such conditions, we believe it is appropriate to use those prices to determine
FMV.
Id. at 46,155.
212. Id.
213. Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans From the People's Republic of China, 56
Fed. Reg. 55,271, 55,273 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (final LTFV determination) [hereinafter
Final Fans]. Commerce held that the Respondent failed to provide adequate evidence
that the prices of PRC sourced inputs were market-driven because they were purchased in market economy currencies. Id.
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was a NME, began filing CVD cases against the PRC fan and lug nut
manufacturers. The petitioners alleged that these manufacturers were

beneficiaries of bounties or grants within the meaning of section 303 of
United States CVD law. 14 Commerce's finding that bubbles of capital-

ism could exist within a NME opened the door for CVD petitions filed
by United States industries challenging the applicability of the
Georgetown Steel rationale to NMEs in transition!" In addition, United States firms filed an appeal challenging the use of the bubbles approach in the Lug Nuts decision." 6
After adopting the bubbles of capitalism approach, Commerce faced
the possibility that by finding NME sourced factor input prices were

market-driven, it would expose NME manufacturers to liability under
section 303 of United States CVD law. Commerce appeared unwilling to

face the prospect of applying United States CVD law without an injury
test against manufacturers from economies in transition.2t7 Alternatively, on appeal, the CIT could overturn Commerce's decision to use the
bubbles approach within the factors of production methodology. Over-

turning the bubbles approach would prevent Commerce from acknowledging and rewarding NME manufacturers for participating in market
reform efforts. Therefore, it was not surprising that subsequent to its
final determination in Lug Nuts, Commerce sought, and was granted, a
214. Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans From the People's Republic of China, 56
Fed. Reg. 57,616 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (initiation of CVD investigations) [hereinafter
Initiation Fans CVD]; Chrome Plated Lug Nuts From the People's Republic of China,
57 Fed. Reg. 877 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (initiation of CVD investigations) [hereinafter
Initiation Lug Nuts CVD]; Bello et al., supra note 46, at 713-14.
215. Initiation Fans CVD, supra note 214, at 57,616. The petitioner alleged that:
[R]egardless of the nature of the PRC economy, the PRC fans sector operates
substantially pursuant to market principles and that the CVD law should apply.
Therefore, [Commerce] must decide (1) whether the PRC fans sector does, in
fact, operate in a market setting;, and (2) if so, whether the CVD law can be
applied to this sector. In order to answer these questions, we must start with
the fundamental principles set forth in [Georgetown Steel.
Id
Commerce concluded that:
[fIt is appropriate to investigate whether the CVD law applies to fan producers
and, if so, whether fan producers in the PRC receive bounties or grants within
the meaning of section 303 of the Act.
Id. at 57,617.
216. Consolidated Int'l Automotive, Inc. v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 1007 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1992).
217. See Harris, supra note 126, at 429 (stating that the Commerce Department
abandoned its initial adjudicating approach by adopting the MOI test).
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remand from the CIT to reconsider the bubbles approach."' However,
before issuing its Amended Final Determination in Lug Nuts,219 Commerce abandoned the bubbles approach altogether in the case involving
Sulfanilic Acid From the PRCY ° In place of the bubbles approach,
Commerce adopted the more restrictive Market Oriented Industry (MOI)
approach for determining whether to use NME in transition sourced
inputs in calculating FMV.
2. The Market Oriented Industry Approach
Relying on statements made during the initiation of CVD cases involving Fans and Lug Nuts from the PRC, Commerce announced the
MOI approach for determining when NME in transition sourced factor
input prices were market-driven in Preliminary Sulfanilic Acid.21 In
Preliminary Sulfanilic Acid, Commerce established the criteria for determining when NME in transition manufacturers operated within a market
oriented industry.'
First, government involvement in setting the price and volume of
production for the merchandise under investigation must be nearly nonexistent.2' Second, private or collective ownership should characterize
the entire industry under investigation, rather than just the producer in
question. 4 Third, market-determined prices must be paid for all but an
insignificant portion of the inputs accounting for the total value of the

218. See Consolidated Int'l Automotive, 797 F. Supp. at 1009 (holding that before
all the issues in the case were decided Commerce's motion for remand on the issue
of use of the bubbles approach granted); Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 199, at 4
(noting that following the remand of Consolidated Int'l Automotive, the Commerce
Department developed the MOI test).
219. Chrome Plated Lug Nuts From the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg.
15,052 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (amended final LTFV determination) [hereinafter Amended Final Lug Nuts].
220. Sulfanilic Acid From the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 9409
(Dep't Comm. 1992) (prelim. LTFV determination) [hereinafter Preliminary Sulfanilic
Acid].
221. Id. at 9411.
222. Id.
223. Id. Commerce stated: "For example, state required production or allocation of
production of the merchandise, whether for export or domestic consumption in the
nonmarket economy country would be an almost insuperable barrier to finding a market-oriented industry." Id.
224. Id. Commerce elaborated: "There may be state-owned enterprises in the industry but substantial state ownership would weigh heavily against finding a market-oriented industry." Id.
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merchandise.' A manufacturer operating in an industry failing to meet
these conditions will have FMV calculated under the factors of produc-

tion approach utilizing surrogate country costs.'
While Preliminary Sulfanilic Acid ushered in the MOI approach,

Amended Final Lug Nuts, published a month later, provided the rationale
for Commerce's decision to adopt the MOI approach. In Final Lug Nuts,

Commerce found that the prices paid by some manufacturers for PRC
sourced steel and chemicals were market-driven.m But in Amended

Final Lug Nuts Commerce stated that it needed to broaden its examination to look beyond the specific transactions involving the lug nut manufacturers in order to determine whether PRC steel and chemical prices

were market-driven. Under the newly articulated standard, Commerce
determined that the price for steel was not market-driven because the
government played a significant role in the production volume and prices for steel within the PRC. Once Commerce found that PRC fan
and lug nut manufacturers were not operating in market-oriented industries, all CVD cases filed against these manufacturers resulting from
Commerce's findings under the bubbles approach were dismissed."

225. Preliminary Sulfanilic Acid, supra note 220, at 9411.
226. Id.
227. Final Lug Nuts, supra note 207, at 46,155; Amended Final Lug Nuts, supra
note 219, at 15,053.
228. Amended Final Lug Nuts, supra note 219, at 15,053. Commerce stated that:
Upon reexamination, we find that our scope of inquiry was too narrow [under
the bubbles approach]. The absence of explicit government involvement in these
transactions is not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the prices for these
inputs are market-driven. Instead, it is necessary to examine whether market
forces are at work in determining the steel and chemical prices within the PRC.
[For example, it may be the case that the state purchases large quantities of
the input in question. Where this is so, it is reasonable to assume that the
state's purchases affect the quantity available to non-state consumers and the
prices they would pay. Also, where the state owns many of the input producers
and where the input is an important commodity fundamental to the operation of
the larger economy, it is not at all clear that the pricing and production of
those input producers would mirror those of privately-owned, profit maximizing
enterprises.
Id.
229. See id. (explaining that no need existed to review other inputs based on these
findings).
230. Oscillating and Ceiling Fans From the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed.
Reg. 10,011 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (neg. prelim. determination) [hereinafter Preliminary
Negative CVD Fans] (announcing the negative CVD determination based on
Commerce's findings in Preliminary Sulfanilic Acid); Oscillating and Ceiling Fans
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Commerce provided guidance for future United States firms contemplating filing CVD cases against manufacturers from economies in transition
by announcing that if the conditions imposed under the MOI approach
were not met, no CVD investigation was necessary."I The question
then arose whether Commerce would ever find that a NME manufacturer satisfied the conditions imposed by the MOI approach.
Since the MOI approach was announced, commentators with differing
perspectives toward NME in transition manufacturers have criticized it
on various grounds. Some object to the MOI approach because the test,
especially the third prong, almost guarantees that no MOI will be
found. 2 Another criticism is that Commerce's determination that "significantly all" factor input prices must be market-driven is ambiguous
and can lead to arbitrary results. 3 Furthermore, under the MOI approach, a NME government can enact substantial market reform while
remaining immunized from CVD investigations, thereby retaining the
benefits of an injury determination under United States AD law. 4
From the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,018 (Dep't Comm. 1992)
(final neg. CVD determination) (announcing that the PRC fans industry is not an
MOI and that, therefore, the CVD law is not applicable to that industry); Chrome
Plated Lug Nuts and Wheel Locks From the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed.
Reg. 10,459 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (rescission of initiation of CVD investigation due to
the adoption of the MOI approach).
231. Preliminary Negative CVD Fans, supra note 230, at 10,012. Commerce discussed the impact of the MOI approach on CVD investigations when it stated:
If an MOI exists, thereby permitting dumping margins to be calculated using
the NME producer's actual costs and prices, the United States industries would
be left at a disadvantage if they were not able to seek protection from subsidies to that industry ....
On the other hand, if an industry is determined to
be nonmarket, so that [Commerce] would have to value the factors of production in a surrogate country, subsidies to the NME producers become irrelevant-any AD margin would not be calculated using NME prices potentially
influenced by subsidies.
Id.
232. Lawrence J. Bogard & Linda C. Menghetti, The Treatment of Non-Market
Economies Under U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law: A Petitioner's
Perspective, in THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE SPEAKS 1992: DEVELOPMENTS IN IMPORT ADMINISTRATION; EXPORT AND INVESTMENT ABROAD, at 6-7 (PLI Corp. Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 789, 1992), available in WESTLAW, JLR
database; Kearney & Wang, supra note 65, at 9. Kearney and Wang believe that the
MOI test is as ineffective as the Commerce Department's bubbles of capitalism test
for NME industries. Id.
233. Kearney & Wang, supra note 65, at 10. Kearney and Wang argue that the
MOI test will victimize producers who act within a free market. Id.
234. Bogard & Menghetti, supra note 232, at 9-11. Additionally, Bogard and
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On the opposite side, other commentators believe that the MOI test
fails to resolve the "risk" of future United States CVD liability without
the benefit of an injury test 5 However, the replacement of section
303 with section 262 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act means that
future United States CVD cases involving NME or economy in transition manufacturers may require an injury test ' Additionally, a con-

cern exists that CVD liability will apply retroactively to actions taken by
NME governments prior to the introduction of market reforms.m Finally, these commentators object to Commerce's policy of linking FMV
determinations in dumping cases with potential CVD liability. These
commentators believe that it would be detrimental to the market reform

process if potential CVD liability was linked to Commerce's efforts to
develop alternative approaches for calculating FMV in case involving

economy in transition manufacturers.'

Menghetti argue that the third element of the MOI approach is inconsistent with
Georgetown Steel, and that as Georgetown Steel is a judicial exception to section

1303, the administrative expansion of the court's decision in Georgetown Steel is
unlawful. Id. at 10.
235. Carey et al., supra note 65, sec. H, at 15-16; Harris, supra note 126, at
441. Mr. Harris argues:
Once a substantial portion of the economy has privatized and the Commerce
Department begins recognizing that market-oriented enterprises exist, U.S. doThis perverse
mestic industry will begin bringing CVD suits en masse ....
incentive structure creates the anomaly of initially applying countervailing duties
to those industries that most aggressively pursue privatization, while leaving
those enterprises remaining state-owned [without the threat of CVD liability].
Id. at 441-42.
236. See supra notes 109-27 and accompanying text (explaining the United States
CVD law under section 303 and the effect of replacement by section 262 of the Uruguay Round Agreements).
237. Carey et al., supra note 65, sec. I, at 15-16. The authors write that:
The biggest concern facing Russian producers is that the U.S. CVD law will
apply to them retroactively, such that participation in government programs
today could lead to CVD liability tomorrow ....
[Sluch a retroactive withdrawal of the Georgetown Steel exemption occurred in the 1993 Certain Steel Products from Germany decision [sic], where

Commerce-ITA determined that the CVD laws would apply to the former East
Germany after October 1990, reasoning that on that date the region began 'operating under a market-oriented economy for which the concept of subsidies
does have meaning.
Id.

238. Id. sec. I, at 6-7. The authors believe that:
Soon after announcing the new policy [bubbles approach], however, CommerceITA so tightened the test for its application [by adopting the MOI approach] as
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Despite widespread criticism, the MOI approach remains Commerce's
policy due to the Clinton Administration and Congress' inability to
provide new statutory guidance to Commerce in cases involving economies in transition. Before discussing possible amendments to United
States unfair trade laws to address the economies in transition issue, an
examination of how the MOI approach operated in a specific case is
instructive. Commerce's preliminary findings in Certain Helical Spring
Lock Washers From the PRC is an example of the difficulties faced by
economy in transition manufacturers under the MOI approach. " 9
In Preliminary Helical Washers, Commerce sought information from
the PRC in order to determine whether the spring lock washer industry
was sufficiently market-oriented to have FMV based on the actual prices
paid by PRC manufacturers.2" The Chinese government sought to satisfy each of the three prongs of the MOI approach in order to show that
the spring lock washer industry was market oriented. 4' Commerce relied upon information provided by the Chinese government as analyzed
in a memorandum prepared by the Acting Director of Antidumping Investigations. 4
As to the first prong, the Chinese government stated that it was not
involved in setting the production volume or prices in the spring lock
washer industry. 43 However, Commerce found the record insufficient

to virtually preclude the possibility that any part of an NME dumping calculation would be based on actual costs . . . Commerce-ITA's response was to
create a direct linkage between application of the Standard Methodology to
NME imports and their exposure to CVD liability, and to establish a narrow
test governing eligibility for both. The difficult issue of whether and how the
CVD law would be applied to transitional economies was thus avoided, but at
the cost of much-needed reform of the NME Methodology for determining
dumping.
[T]he net result of this two-year odyssey was to retain the NME Methodology and the Georgetown Steel exemption until comprehensive economy-wide
reform is achieved.
Id.
239. Certain Helical Spring Lock Washers From the People's Republic of China,
58 Fed. Reg. 26,112 (Dep't Comm. 1993) (notice of prelim. LTFV determination)
[hereinafter Preliminary Helical Washers].
240. id. at 26,113.
241. Memorandum re: Market-Oriented Industry (MOI) Status of the Chinese Lock
Washer Industry 2-3 (Jan. 19, 1993) [hereinafter Lock Washer Memo].
242. Preliminary Helical Washers, supra note 239, at 26,113; id.
243. Lock Washer Memo, supra note 241, at 2. The memo quotes the Chinese
government as stating:
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to determine the nature of control exerted by central or regional government bodies. 2" The second prong of the MOI approach, relating to
ownership of enterprises in the lock washer industry, revealed that six of
the sixteen manufacturers were state-owned. 2" Therefore, Commerce
determined that there was "substantial state ownership" within the lock
washer industry. 2' Under the third prong of the MOI approach, one
manufacturer, Hangzhou, stated it imported all of its primary raw materials from market economies and paid market prices for all PRC sourced
factor inputs.2' PRC government authorities were unable to provide
information regarding the market-driven nature of the factor inputs for
the remaining fifteen firms.2 Because Commerce requires a view of
the entire industry under investigation, Commerce determined that market-determined prices were not paid for all significant inputs, even
though Hangzhou provided information on prices it paid for its factor
inputs.249 Despite the Chinese government's attempt to provide sufficient information to Commerce, it was unable to persuade Commerce
that the first two prongs of the MOI approach were met. Even though
the PRC made the effort to comply with Commerce's information request, it was unable to provide the requisite information to address the
third prong of the MOI approach. This example indicates the difficulty
in fully complying with Commerce's information requests.
Under the MOI approach, Commerce presumes that the NME in transition government controls an industry, unless the foreign manufacturer
can prove otherwise. It is difficult for NME in transition manufacturers
to rebut Commerce's presumption by proving a negative, namely that no
government control exists. Because the MOI approach has caused so
much confusion and disagreement, the Administration will eventually

IThe government of China exerts no control over the lock washer industry.
Each producer is responsible for making all decisions regarding production and
sale of lockwashers, and for managing all profits and losses generated from the
production of lockwashers.

Id
244. Id. at 2-3.
245. Id. at 2. The percentage of the total lock washer production produced by

state-owned manufacturers was withheld from the public version of the Lock Washer
Memo. Id.
246. Id. at 3.
247. Id at 2.
248. Lock Washer Memo, supra note 241, at 2-3.

249. Id. at 3.

1048

AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 10:3

develop a new policy for administering United States unfair trade laws
in cases involving manufacturers operating in economies in transition.
3. Conclusion
With the adoption of the more stringent MOI approach, Commerce
continues to analyze NME in transition manufacturer costs exclusively
under AD law. Commerce has avoided analyzing cases involving NMEs
in transition utilizing the AD law in conjunction with an analysis of
potential CVD liability. With the replacement of section 303, Commerce
should not resist utilizing the CVD law in conjunction with United
States AD law in cases involving NMEs or economies in transition that
are deemed Subsidy Agreement countries under section 262 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, because under either the AD or the CVD
law, a showing of injury to a United States industry is required.
Furthermore, Commerce should reexamine its policy of refusing to
impose CVD liability against non-Subsidy Agreement countries in order
to capture all governmental interference in an economy. If NME in
transition manufacturers purchase NME sourced inputs which benefit
from subsidies, Commerce should analyze the downstream effect of the
subsidy. But if Commerce acknowledges that NME sourced inputs could
receive subsidies, NME in transition manufacturers would be exposed to
potential CVD liability regardless of whether they are entitled to an
injury determination. However, Commerce's recognition that NME governments grant subsidies would indicate a reversal of Commerce's position in Georgetown Steel. Therefore, rather than develop an approach
which acknowledges the market reforms occurring in NMEs, Commerce
has opted to raise the bar against NME in transition manufacturers by
adopting the MOI approach that few, if any, economy in transition
industries can meet.
The bubbles of capitalism approach is analytically superior to the
MOI approach for several reasons. First, the bubbles approach better
achieves the policy goals of accuracy, fairness, and predictability in calculating FMV as enunciated in Lug Nuts." Additionally, to establish
consistency with the policy goals underlying United States unfair trade
laws, a CVD rather than an AD investigation should determine the
effect subsidies have on NME in transition sourced factor inputs. United
States AD and CVD laws- were designed to work together to offset the

250. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text (articulating the policy goals
in determining the calculation of FMV).
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impact of unfair trading practices, and Commerce should use them in
tandem during investigations of economy in transition manufacturers,

Georgetown Steel and prior administrative practice notwithstanding.
Second, the bubbles of capitalism approach focuses on an individual
manufacturer's costs, and not the entire industry's costs. Using the market-driven costs of a NME manufacturer's domestically-sourced inputs
provides an incentive for those individual manufacturers to continue to
operate under market principles. Additionally, NME in transition manufacturers receiving the benefits of the bubbles approach will have an
advantage over other producers of similar products in the United States
market. To the extent that the United States export market is important
to the success of NME in transition manufacturers, the manufacturers
will reduce their dependence on government subsidies and initiate their
own market reforms."5 Therefore, the bubbles approach promotes market reforms for individual manufacturers within the economy in transition. Furthermore, the use of the CVD law will assist in eliminating the
effects of both direct and indirect subsidies, because manufacturers will
implement market principles to avoid United States CVD liability.
Third, use of the bubbles of capitalism approach will encourage cooperation in AD investigations. If a NME manufacturer believes it can
prevail upon Commerce to use its actual costs in calculating FMV, the
manufacturer should be more willing to share information. In contrast to
the Helical Washer case, individual manufacturers providing information
regarding domestically-sourced input pricing will be rewarded.
Commerce's task is to design an approach for implementing the factor
of production methodology that protects United States industry from
unfair trade practices, while accurately capturing the costs of NME in
transition manufacturers. The broader policy question is whether the
Clinton Administration and Congress can agree on legislation that rewards those manufacturers participating in the market reform process,
thereby reinforcing United States efforts encouraging governments in
NME countries to continue implementing market reforms.
The bubbles of capitalism approach, while analytically superior to the
current MOI approach, is not the only means for the United States to
deal with NMEs in transition. The Clinton Administration proposed

251. If the NME manufacturer does not export to the United States, then United
States unfair trade laws have no impact on that firm's decision-making. If other market economy nations importing goods from NME manufacturers adopt laws similar to
the United States, then all NME manufacturers exporting to market economies will
have a similar incentive to avoid government control and subsidies.
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statutory language dealing with economies in transition in the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act. Although the Administration's proposals were
eventually dropped from the Act, 2 the proposals serve as a useful
starting point for discussing possible future changes in United States
unfair trade laws relating to economies in transition. Additionally, other
commentators have suggested numerous methods for addressing issues
relating to economies in transition under United States unfair trade laws.
These proposals, along with the author's suggestions, will be discussed
below.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN UNITED STATES AD/CVD
LAWS RELATING TO NMEs IN TRANSITION
A. ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS FOR NMEs IN TRANSITION
Initially, the Clinton Administration declined to amend United States
unfair trade laws to deal specifically with economies in transition. After
reconsidering its position, the Administration ultimately made two proposals to the congressional committees drafting the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act relating to economies in transition. However, neither of
the two provisions were included in the final version of the Uruguay
Round Agreements ActY
The first Administration proposal was to create a special category for
economies in transition under United States unfair trade laws. 4 The
proposal was intended to provide a mechanism for protecting United
States industry from unfair imports from manufacturers in economies in
transition, while simultaneously promoting the United States foreign
policy goal of encouraging the economic and political reforms underway
in NME in transition countries." Under the new provision, economies

252. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (stating that the House and Senate
agreed to drop proposed anti-dumping provisions from the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act).
253. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (discussing the Administration's
introduction of NME in transition proposals).
254. Administration Proposal: Economies in Transition [hereinafter Initial EIT Proposal]; see also Special Report, INSiDE U.S. TRADE, July 15, 1994, at S-5 [hereinafter
Special Report, July 15, 1994] (detailing the Administration's "economies in transition" proposal).
255. Special Report, July 15, 1994, supra note 254, at S-5. Commerce Department
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration Susan Esserman was reported to have
said:
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in transition were defined as those countries instituting a right to private
property and establishing a mechanism for privatizing state-owned enterprises. 6 Additionally, the new provision would have substantially altered the administration of United States trade laws by eliminating

Commerce's participation in cases involving manufacturers from NMEs
in transition. Under the new provision, only the ITC would review peti-

m '
tions for relief in cases of economy in transition imports.
The economies in transition provision would have been effective for

five years, during which time no other United States unfair trade statute
would apply to NMEs in transition. 8 The proposal would have eliminated the dumping calculation, and required mandatory relief upon a
showing of serious injury or threat of serious injury to a United States
industry by reason of increasing imports from an economy in transition
country.5 The proposal's requirement of serious injury to a United
States industry was the same injury standard required in section 201
safeguard cases, but a higher standard than the showing of material
injury required under United States AD and CVD laws. m But accord-

the Administration will use a 'set of criteria' to identify which countries would
be considered economies in transition rather than naming them specifically in
the legislation. For example, countries would have to have instituted a right to
private property and have started a process of privatization . .. The principal
countries eligible would be the states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, and... the change [is) not meant to benefit the People's Republic of
China. (emphasis added).
Special Report, June 21, 1994, supra note 5, at S-23.
256. Initial ErT Proposal, supra note 254; see also Special Report, July 15, 1994,
supra note 255, at S-5 n.247 (discussing the distinction between the market and nonmarket economies in the Administration proposal).
257. Initial E1r Proposal, supra note 254.
258. Id.; see also Special Report, July 15, 1994, supra note 254, at S-5 (discussing the details of the non-application provision of the Administration's proposal).
259. Special Report, July 15, 1994, supra note 254, at S-5.
260. Compare Initial ELT Proposal, supra note 254; Special Report, July 15, 1994,
supra note 254, at S-5; Special Report, June 21, 1994, supra note 5, at S-1 with
United States Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988). Section 201 is
based on Article 19 of GATr, Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products.
These provisions permit GATT members to enact temporary trade barriers against the
injurious effects of foreign imports that result from fair trade. Id. Under United States
AD and CVD laws, a petitioner must show merely serious injury, which means not
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A). Under section
2252(c)(1)(A) and (B), however, the ITC must take into account the economic factors,
including but not limited to:
(A) with respect to serious injury-
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ing to the Administration, the requirement that the serious injury result
from increasing NME in transition imports is a lower standard than the
causation standard contained in section 201.26' If a petition included
imports from more than one economy in transition country, the ITC
could combine all the imports in order to make its injury determination.262 The proposal would have required a remedy if the ITC determined that increasing imports from a NME in transition country was the
cause of serious injury or threat of serious injury to a United States

industry.

3

After a positive injury determination by the ITC, the Administration's
proposal mandated that the United States provide a remedy to United
States industry in the form of increased tariffs, tariff rate-quotas, quotas,
or international negotiations.2" Although the available remedies were
broader than under the AD law, the Administration had discretion to apply any remedy it deemed appropriate in a given case.265 Remedies imposed in a given case would remain for a minimum of three years."
(i) the significant idling of productive facilities in the domestic industry,
(ii) the inability of a significant number of firms to carry out domestic production operations at a reasonable level of profit, and
(iii) significant unemployment or underemployment within the domestic industry;
(emphasis added)
(B) with respect to threat of serious injuryand a downward trend in produc(i) a decline in sales or market share ....
tion, profits, wages, or employment . . .
(ii) [domestic firms are] unable to generate adequate capital to finance themodemization of their domestic plants and equipment, or . . . research and development, . . .
19 U.S.C. §§ 2252(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
261. Special Report, June 21, 1994, supra note 5, at S-1. Deputy United States
Trade Representative Rufus Yerxa told reporters:
[T]he new rules would not use. the same standard as section 201 safeguard
procedures to establish whether imports are the cause of injury. Instead, the
new proposal for economies in transition uses a lower causation standard according to which petitioners would have to prove to the International Trade
Commission that imports are a 'cause of injury,' ....
Id.
Section 202 of the United States Trade Act of 1974 provides that "[flor purposes of this section, the term 'substantial cause' means a cause which is important
and not less than any other cause." 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(B).
262. Initial EIT Proposal, supra note 254.
263. Id.
264. Id.; Special Report, July 15, 1994, supra note 254, at S-5.
265. Initial E1T Proposal, supra note 254; Special Report, July 15, 1994, supra
note 254, at S-5.
266. Initial Err Proposal, supra note 254; Special Report, July 15, 1994, supra
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While the remedies in the Administration's initial proposal were designed to relieve economy in transition countries from the effects of the
AD law, the Administration recognized that such relief should not exist
indefinitely.
Because the Administration wanted to further the policy goal of encouraging market reforms in economy in transition countries, the Admin-7
istration required review of the proposed provision after five years..2
At the conclusion of the review, countries would either "graduate" to
market economy status or return to the NME category." Presumably,
NMEs in transition that graduated to market economy status would become subject to the standard methodology for calculating FMV under
United States AD law and subject to United States CVD liability. For
those countries that returned to NME status, the current MOI approach
of Commerce, or some new approach, would determine liability under
United States AD law. Because the Administration's initial economies in
transition proposal was not included in the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, details about the treatment of economy in transition countries at the
end of the five-year period remain unclear.
After the congressional committees drafting the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act declined to include the Administration's initial proposal
in the final bill, the Administration proposed a more modest proposal
dealing with economies in transition. The second Administration proposal permitted Commerce to suspend AD investigations in circumstances where the foreign manufacturer agrees to stop sales at LTFV, or
under extraordinary circumstances, where an agreement exists to eliminate the injurious activity.' The second Administration proposal provided Commerce with a broader range of options in negotiating suspension agreements in cases involving NMEs for a period of eighteen
months. 0 Therefore, the suspension agreement proposal was intended

note 254, at S-5.
267. Initial Err Proposal, supra note 254; Special Report, July 15, 1994, supra
note 254, at S-5.
268. Initial ELT Proposal, supra note 254.
269. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(c) (1988). Section 1673(b) which discusses agreements to
completely eliminate sales at less than fair value or to cease exports of merchandise,
and section 1673(c), which discusses agreements to eliminate injurious effect, provide
the statutory guidelines for Commerce to use in suspending an AD investigation. 19
U.S.C. §§ 1673(b)-(c) (1988).
270. See Improvement of Suspension Authority to Respond to Dumping From
Economies in Transition (ETs) [hereinafter Suspension Proposal] (describing the effects of the adoption of the proposed amendments).
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to reflect a greater receptivity towards reaching suspension agreements in
cases involving economies in transition.27' The Administration argued
that the suspension agreement provision insured that significant injury
caused by imports from economies in transition would be remedied in
the short term, while enhanced enforcement authority would promote
effective long range agreements.272
However, as with the Administration's initial proposal, the suspension
agreement proposal was not included in the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act.273 Both proposals relating to NMEs in transition were too controversial to be included the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Therefore,
the question of how, or if, the United States should amend its unfair
trade laws to account for the market reforms taking place in NMEs
remains unanswered.
B. PROPOSAL OF THE U.S.-RuSSIA BusINEss COUNCIL
The U.S.-Russia Business Council (Business Council) has also proposed several changes to the treatment of Russia under United States
unfair trade laws.274 Although the focus of the Business Council is on
Russia, the proposed changes are equally applicable to other NMEs in
transition. The Business Council believes that some of these changes
require congressional action, while the executive branch may accomplish
others on its own.275 The Business Council's proposed legislative package is very similar to the Administration's initial proposal to create a
new category for economy in transition countries.
The legislative agenda proposed by the Business Council is as ambitious as the Administration's initial proposal.276 Because the Business
Council believes that the methodology for determining FMV for manufacturers operating in economies in transition is unreliable, the Council

271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the dropping of EIT
language from the Uruguay Round Agreements Act on September 10, 1994).
274. Carey et al., supra note 65, sec. IV, at 1-8 (outlining proposals for the reform of transitional relief to Russia under United States trade laws).
275. Id. This author is skeptical that the President can achieve the goals of Business Council for two reasons: I) Major changes in the application of United States
trade laws through executive orders are of questionable constitutional validity given
Congress' activity in the trade law area; and 2) Congress simply would not permit
the President to act unilaterally.
276. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the Administration's Uruguay Round Agreements Act proposals).
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proposed eliminating the use of the dumping margins in AD cases involving RussiaY' Instead, action against imports from Russian manufacturers would occur only if a serious injury to a United States industry.' As with the Administration's initial proposal, the Business
Council recommends the adoption of the serious injury standard similar
to that used under 19 U.S.C. § 2252.' Alternatively, the Business
Council proposed the adoption of a "benchmark pricing test" that defines dumping as the pricing of products below an established benchmark pricem As the benchmark methodology would provide greater
predictability, the Business Council asserts that the benchmark methodology would represent an improvement over the current AD methodology., The Business Council also recommends several steps that the
277. Carey et al., supra note 65, sec. IV, at 3. 6-7 (offering alternatives to current
United States anti-dumping provisions). The Business Council's proposal provides:
Congress should recognize through legislation that, given the present stage of
development of the Russian economy, it is impossible or not cost effective to
accurately measure price discrimination and sales below cost to assess whether
or not dumping has occurred. Surrogate methodologies generally have not
worked and have permitted the imposition of significant penalties on NME
importers based on tenuous evidence. Instead of continuing to create hypothetical dumping models, with their arbitrary and unpredictable results, Congress
should regulate Russian imports solely on the basis of their injurious effect on
U.S. industry.
Id. at 6.
278. Id. at 6-7.
279. Id. at 6-7. The Business Council proposal provides:
The injury- standard made applicable to Russia under this approach should be
significantly strengthened. A 'serious injury' test should be adopted, similar to
the test that governs so-called 'safeguards' or 'escape clause' actions against
imports which harm U.S. industry but are not necessarily unfairly traded.
The higher injury standard should be accompanied by a presumption,
similar to that which exists in the safeguards provisions of the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement...
and the North American Free Trade Agreement ...
that imports below a certain threshold level will not be found to
cause serious injury.

Id (footnotes omitted).
280. Id. at 7. The Business Council's proposal suggests that:
Alternatively [to elimination of calculating NME dumping], the NME methodology should be replaced by a 'benchmark pricing test' that defines dumping as
the pricing of products imported into the United States at below a specified
benchmark price. Not only would such a test greatly enhance predictability, in
most cases it would be considerably less arbitrary in its treatment on Russian
imports than the current methodology.
Id.
281. Id. The Business Council proposal states that:
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President may take in the absence of congressional action to assist Russia in navigating through the sometimes turbulent waters of United
States trade laws.
The Business Council's first proposal is that the President issue an
executive order designating Russia as a "Transitional Economy" entitled
to special trade relief." The trade relief would center around creation
of a consultative mechanism to address individual trade disputes as an
alternative to the costly, rigid, and adversarial use of litigation. 83 Furthermore, the President could issue an executive order requiring AD or
CVD petitioners to utilize the consultative mechanism before filing a
petition with Commerce.284
The Business Council further proposes that the President issue an
executive order covering three areas of potential CVD liability of Russian manufacturers. 5 First, during the period Russia is designated a
"Transitional Economy," Russia would continue to receive an exemption
from liability under United States CVD law."' Second, the proposal
would permit only a prospective determination of Russian CVD liability
upon termination of the transitional economy designation, thereby insulating Russia from liability for previous subsidization."' Third, the executive order would dissolve Commerce's linkage between the methodology for determining FMV under the AD law and potential liability
under the CVD law."8 The Business Council believes these measures
During the review and debate preceding the 1988 Trade Act amendments, three
basic benchmark price formulas were suggested: (1) the lowest importing market
economy price; (2) the average price of all market economy country imports;
and (3) the average price of the imports from the market economy country with
the largest volume of imports into the United States . . . . The lowest, fairly
traded, import price is thus a more appropriate benchmark price, because in
most cases Russian products cannot compete at significantly higher prices [due
to quality concerns among consumers].

Id. (footnotes omitted).
282. Carey et al., supra note 65, at 1 (indicating that the special designation
would last for an initial period of three to five years with subsequent biannual reviews).
283. Id. at 2 (proposing the creation of a bilateral United States-Russia Trade
Commission, modeled after the Canada-United States Trade Commission, which would
resolve trade disputes through a variety of consultation and voluntary arbitration pro-

cedures).
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Carey et al., supra note 65, at 3.
Id
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regarding CVD liability are necessary to prevent substantial tariff liability and the chilling of foreign investment in Russian industries.m Additionally, the Business Council asserts that the President can amend certain administrative practices through the use of executive orders.
Although the Business Council prefers to eliminate the requirement
for calculating FMV and the dumping margin in cases involving Russia,
it argues that if FMV is calculated, Commerce should utilize the actual
costs of Russian producers under the standard methodology for calculating FMV used for market economy manufacturers.' Additionally,
the proposal would limit Commerce's use of the best information available method for determining FMV when prices from the Russian manufacturer are not verifiable.29' Furthermore, the Business Council proposed that in situations where the standard methodology is not available,
state-owned enterprises should be permitted to show autonomy from
governmental control in order to qualify for manufacturer-specific dumping margins7' Finally, the Business Council proposed that the Presi289. Id.
290. Id. The Business Council's proposal states:
[WMe recommend that the Administration adopt an explicit policy of use, to the
greatest extent practicable, actual rather than surrogate country costs in assessing
whether dumping has occurred. Specifically, the Standard Methodology (used to
calculate dumping by market economy producers) should be used to calculate a
Russian producer's cost of production . . . to the extent it purchases production
inputs at arm's-length; in markets transactions; and on the basis of price, quality and terms considerations.
Commerce-ITA should thus adopt an approach of using actual costs to
value individual inputs in determining NME cost of production even in the
presence of some governmental controls.
Id. sec. IV, at 4.
291. Id. sec. IV, at 4 (noting that under the best information available rule, "Commerce-ITA is free to determine dumping based on any evidence in the record"). This
provides an incentive for NME manufacturers to provide requested information. Id.
292. Carey et al., supra note 65, sec. IV, at 5. The Business Council's proposal
provides:
We recommended . . . that Commerce-ITA use actual cost data (i.e., the Standard Methodology) to calculate dumping by Russian producers to the greatest
extent practicable. This should, as with market economies, generally result in a
dumping assessment of individual enterprises. However, to the extent this policy
cannot be implemented, state-owned NME enterprises should be permitted to
demonstrate their autonomy from government control in order to qualify for
producer-specific antidumping duty rates under the NME methodology. Commerce-ITA should thus abandon the per se exclusion of state-owned NME producers from eligibility for company-specific dumping margins ....
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dent order Commerce to establish a consultative mechanism to guide
Russian companies through the intricacies of United States trade
laws.293
The proposals advanced by the Business Council would fundamentally
alter the trade laws governing Russia, and all other countries designated
as economies in transition. Some commentators have suggested less
comprehensive reforms to United States trade laws in order to deal with
economies in transition. The most common suggestion is to amend section 406 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to provide greater flexibility in dealing with NMEs in transition.
C. AMENDING SECTION 406
Although section 406 is rarely utilized,294 it has received attention
from those seeking changes in the treatment of NMEs in transition under United States trade laws.295 For example, the Business Council proposed removing Russia from the list of countries covered by section 406
due to the commercial uncertainty and political stigma created by
Russia's identification as a "communist" country.2 At the other extreme, two commentators recommend abandoning the use of AD laws in
cases involving economy in transition manufacturers and substituting an

amended section 406.297
Some commentators characterize section 406 as superior to AD laws
in dealing with manufacturers operating within economies in transition
because section 406 does not require a LTFV determination, the use of
surrogate countries, or the calculation of prices in inflationary economies
subject to the fluctuating exchange rates.29 Furthermore, section 406 is
293. Id. sec. IV, at 6.
294. Neeley, supra note 56 (noting that historical evidence indicates section 406 is
rarely used).
295. Compare Carey et al., supra note 65, sec. IV, at 5 (suggesting that the application of section 406 creates unwarranted commercial uncertainty and political stigma to Russia); Neeley, supra note 56, at 548-51 (suggesting that section 406 should
be revised to give the President wider discretion to implement ITC determinations
which fall under section 406) with Richard N. Eid, The Effect of Georgetown Steel
Corp. v. United States on Nonmarket Economy Imports, 3 AM. UJ. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 65, 89-97 (1988) (recommending that Congress explicitly define what constitutes "significant cause" for ITC).
296. See Carey et al., supra note 65, sec. IV, at 5 (noting that the term "communist" countries in section 406 attaches political stigma which affects Russia and other
former communist countries).
297. Neeley, supra note 56, at 550-54; Eid, supra note 294, at 89-97.
298. Eid, supra note 295, at 90-91. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e) states:
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considered more economical than AD laws to administer.2 9 However,
the two commentators advocating reform of section 406 provide differing views on exactly how to amend it.
One commentator, Richard N. Eid, believes that the President should

have discretion in implementing ITC decisions under section 406 because it promotes consideration of foreign policy concerns before the
United States takes remedial action against manufacturers from economies in transition countries.

Mr. Eid also advocates legislative

amendments to section 406 changing the section's rapidly increasing
imports standard,"' as well as further defining the material injury standard and the significant cause standard." 3
Another commentator, Jeffrey S. Neeley, argues for limitations on

presidential discretion in order to remove politics from the decisionmaking process.' Therefore, Mr. Neeley seeks to amend section 406
by including an advisory opinion procedure,'

using prices charged in

(2)(A) Market disruption exists within a domestic industry whenever imports of
an article, like or directly competitive with an article produced by such domestic industry, are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a
significant cause of material injury, or threat thereof, to such domestic industry.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A):
(i) Imports of an article shall be considered to be increasing rapidly if there
has been a significant increase in such imports (either actual or relative to
domestic production) during a recent period of time.
(ii) The term 'significant cause' refers to a cause which contributes significantly
to the material injury of the domestic industry, but need not be equal to or
greater than any other cause.

19 U.S.C. § 2346(e)(2)(A)-(B).
299. Eid, supra note 295, at 92 (noting that under section 406, litigation of trade
conflicts is reduced considerably).
300. Id. at 92 (commenting that the President will consider international consequences prior to the imposition of sanctions).
301. Id. at 93-95. Two main problems exist with the rapidly increasing imports
standard. 1) Congress failed to provide a time frame for determining import growth
and the ITC lacks historical information necessary to make the determination; and 2)
NME manufacturers could manipulate their imports to avoid the rapidly increasing
standard and United States manufacturers would be denied relief. Id.
302. Id. at 95-96. Congress should provide objective criteria for determining material injury such as those present in section 201. Id.
303. Id. at 96-97. Apparently "significant cause" "occupies a middle position between 'substantial cause' and 'contribute importantly,"' but Congress should provide
clarification for the ITC. Id.
304. Neeley, supra note 56, at 550.
305. Id. at 550-51 (asserting that an advisory opinion could provide a surrogate in
advance to assist the NME manufacturer in determining potential dumping vulnerabili-
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third countries by economy in transition manufacturers, 3' and developing a new approach to joint ventures and other market entities within
economy in transition countries. 3
Additional suggestions could be offered to amend section 406 to
reflect the changes occurring in economy in transition countries. However, the proposals offered by Messrs. Eid and Neeley for amending
section 406, provide an example of the difficulty involved in reaching a
consensus on the best method for improving the administration of United States unfair trade laws in cases involving NMEs in transition. Although several approaches exist to amend United States unfair trade
laws to deal with the issues surrounding imports from economies in
transition, no consensus concerning whether, or how, the United States
should proceed is evident. The following section of this article will
analyze the proposals examined thus far, and will outline the author's
recommendations.
D.

CONCLUSION

The two proposals by the Clinton Administration, as well as the recommendations by the Business Council and the commentators seeking to
amend section 406, fail to address several of the most fundamental
issues regarding the application of United States unfair trade laws to
support the process of market reform. Any amendments to United States
laws to deal with economy in transition countries should buttress the
broader United States policy of promoting market reforms and democracy. Additionally, any changes to the administration of United States
unfair trade laws toward NME in transition countries must be consistent
with the theoretical principles underlying all of the unfair trade laws.
However, the amendments should permit flexibility by Commerce because the market reform process underway in NME countries may undergo radical alterations in the future. The next section will examine the
two proposals made by the Administration, the Business Council, and

ty). The advisory opinion would serve the overall purpose of reducing the unpredictability which plagues NME AD cases. Id. at 551.
306. Id. at 551-52 (suggesting that Commerce should not automatically refuse to
consider sales in third countries when calculating FMV). Sales to third countries,
combined with a verification of NME cost, may assure that sales are market-driven.
Id.
307. Id. at 552-53. To promote joint ventures and market reforms, calculation of a
dumping margin involving a joint venture requires consistency with the methodology
employed for market economies rather than NMEs. Id. at 553.
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those seeking to change section 406. The author will then offer recom-

mendations on the administration of United States AD and CVD laws in
cases involving manufacturers from NvIE in transition countries.
1. Analysis of Proposals by the Clinton Administration, the Business

Council, and Commentators Seeking to Amend Section 406
a. The Administration's Proposals
The Administration's initial proposal to create a special category with-

in United States trade laws for economies in transition conflicts with the
theoretical principles governing United States trade laws:' Additional-

ly, the proposal is inconsistent with the Administration's broader policy
of supporting market reforms

in NMEsl

A comparison of the

Administration's initial proposal with the market reforms economists
agree NMEs must implement will highlight how the proposal fails to
support long term market reforms.
The Administration's proposed definition of an economy in transition

is too narrow. The Administration defines an economy in transition as
one where the government has instituted the right of private ownership
and established a mechanism for privatizing state-owned enterprises. Establishing private ownership and privatizing state-owned enterprises is
only one of several steps economists believe NMEs must implement to

complete the market reform process successfully.:"0 Any definition of
308. See supra notes 253-68 and accompanying text (discussing the
Administration's initial proposal to create a special category for economies in transition under United States trade laws).
309. International Economics: Treasury Secretary Bensten Urges Russia to Take
Bold Steps with New Reform, DAILY REP. FJoR ExEcuTrvs (BNA) sec. A, at 185
(Sept. 27, 1994). Former Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen stated.
. .. Russia needs to undertake a 'bold stabilization effort' aimed at reducing
inflation quickly; to create modem institutions that work; and to press on with
its integration into the world economy by ratifying the U.S.-Russia Bilateral
Investment Treaty and committing itself to joining the World Trade Organization, which is due to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade next
year ....
Bentsen said that the present situation in Russia worries him:
I can't tell you how this will turn out, . . . [b]ut I do know that to avoid
slipping backward, Russia must take a bold step forward ....
Let me be clear . . . [ojur support has been successfid because our lending is conditional. For Russia to get all the money I've mentioned, it needs a
bold economic reform program.
Id. (emphasis added).
310. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (noting that economists identified
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an economy in transition should also include a review of the
government's actions promoting monetary reform to stop inflation, fiscal
control to limit deficits, wage and price deregulation to link supply and
demand within the economy, and supporting freely convertible currency
to foster the country's integration into world markets. These necessary
market reforms were not addressed in the Administration's proposed
definition of an economy in transition.
Additionally, eliminating the requirement of a dumping determination
and the calculation of FMV would actually decouple the wages and
prices of the economy in transition countries from those of United States
and foreign competitors. Furthermore, the lack of a dumping determination removes some of the incentive for a government to permit free
convertibility of its currency as part of a program of integrating the
NME in transition into the world trading system. If NME in transition
manufacturers are not required to undertake the same business decisions
as market economy manufacturers regarding wages, prices, and currency
fluctuations, no incentive will exist to use market principles in the manufacturing of products they export to the United States. Eliminating the
dumping determination in favor of an injury only determination undermines, rather than supports, the broader process of market reforms underway in economy in transition countries.
The establishment that the "serious injury or threat of serious injury"
standard as the only basis for United States producers to obtain relief
for an economy in transition manufacturer's unfair trading policy also
contradicts United States unfair trade laws and GATT policy. The serious injury standard contradicts United States policy because it divorces
questions regarding the market-oriented practices of a manufacturer from
questions of liability under United States unfair trade laws. Since the
serious injury only standard is a higher standard of injury than required
under United States AD and CVD laws, it probably violates United
States MFN obligations under GATT.3" ' By replacing the dumping determination with a serious injury only test, the United States would treat
economy in transition countries, many of which are not GATT members,
better than current GAT members. Furthermore, the remedies available

the steps to make a successful transition to a market oriented economy,
monetary reform, fiscal control, price and wage deregulation, privatization of
assure social stability, and currency convertibility).
311. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text (noting that the
transition provision initially introduced by the administration contained a less
standard).

including
property,
NME in
stringent
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against economy in transition manufacturers under the Administration's
proposal are theoretically inconsistent with United States obligations to
provide unconditional MFN treatment to GATIr members.
The Administration's initial proposal was intended to provide special
economy in transition status to certain countries for a period of five
years. During the five-year period, no other provision of United States
unfair trade laws could be utilized by United States petitioners in cases
involving economy in transition manufacturers. Therefore, the CVD law
would be unavailable to deter the providing of subsidies to economy in
transition manufacturers. By eliminating the application of the CVD law,
governments of economies in transition countries could avoid enacting
monetary reforms and run budget deficits by supporting inefficient manufacturers exporting to the United States, so long as the subsidized
manufacturers' exports do not cause serious injury to United States
industries. Subsidized manufacturers will not be deterred from accepting
government assistance since United States CVD law would not prevent
the benefit of subsidies to manufacturers in the United States market.
Finally, the Administration's initial proposal called for a review of all
countries with economies in transition status after five years. At the end
of five years, countries would either graduate to market economy status
or return to NME status. No economic rationale exists to justify a fiveyear period. As noted, economists remain uncertain about the pace that
market reforms should take." 2 Given that the road from a NME to a
more market-oriented economy is fraught with difficulty, the Administration should not place a five-year limitation on the process. The limitation could place pressure on economy in transition governments to
proceed with rapid market reform measures at the expense of preserving
the social safety nets economists believe are necessary for maintaining
social stability. The Administration should pursue a policy that is consistent with existing United States unfair trade laws, and is capable of
applying to any economy in transition country on an individual basis
over a longer period of time. As a result, economy in transition countries can avoid sacrificing social stability to guarantee that their exports
enter the United States under market economy status rather than NME
status.

The Administration's second proposal, to increase Commerce's authority to negotiate suspension agreements, was also inconsistent with United
States unfair trade laws principles." 3 Since suspension agreements
312. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (discussing that economists
disagree over the pace of market reforms).
313. See supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text (discussing the
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merely remedy the immediate effects of dumped foreign goods entering
the United States, they fail to respond to the underlying unfair trade
practices causing injury to United States industry. Additionally,
Commerce's increased authority to enter into suspension agreements for
only eighteen months demonstrates that the Administration's second proposal was only a stop gap measure. Therefore, the Administration's
second proposal failed to support long term United States policy goals
of assisting economy in transition countries which pursue market reforms, while protecting United States industries from the injurious effects of unfair trading practices.
Denying foreign governments and manufacturers the perceived benefits
of engaging in unfair trading practices has a deterrent effect." 4 By deterring unfair trading practices, United States AD and CVD laws, combined with those of other nations, assist in promoting the efficient allocation of resources throughout the world. Because the Administration's
two proposals are a departure from the principles governing United
States unfair trade laws, they fail to promote the efficient allocation of
resources within NMEs in transition. By exempting economy in transition countries from investigation under United States AD and CVD laws
which promote efficient resource allocation, the Administration's proposals contradict the broader United States policy of supporting market reforms.
b. The Business Council's Proposals
The Business Council's proposals seeking congressional action are
very similar to those contained in the Administration's initial proposal.315 The theoretical difficulties with the Business Council's proposals
stem from the preferential treatment toward Russia, and other NMEs in
transition. Similar to the Administration's initial proposal, the Business
Council's legislative agenda is to create a mandatory consultative mechanism for economies in transition such as Russia, exempt economies in
transition from United States CVD laws, and eliminate dumping margin
determinations in favor of an injury only standard for application of

Administration's second proposal).
314. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (asserting that the intended
outcome of imposing the CVD law is to deter foreign governments or manufacturers
from utilizing subsidies).
315. See supra notes 274-79 and accompanying text (proposing that a remedy is
required if the 1TC determines that a NME in transition country injures United States
industries).
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United States AD law. However, each of these actions could violate
United States commitments under GAIT. For example, GATT members
from less developed countries, not identified as economies in transition,
that attempt to introduce market reforms, would receive less favorable
treatment than Russia, a non-GATT member. Therefore, United States
action would constitute a violation of GATT's MFN requirement.
Additionally, the theoretical foundations of United States AD and
CVD laws require the most accurate possible identification and
quantification of market-distorting activities of a foreign manufacturer or
government. The Business Council's proposals would increase Russian
exports to the United States in the short run, but would reduce pressure
on Russia to halt dumping and subsidy practices in the long run. Therefore, the Business Council's recommendations do not promote long term
market reforms, which require the efficient allocation of resources within
the Russian economy? 6 Finally, granting favorable trading status to
Russia is beneficial to United States-Russian relations today, but such
concessions may prove difficult to withdraw if relations are damaged in
the future, or the current Russian market reform efforts fail.""
The Business Council also proposed that the President implement
changes in Commerce's administration of United States unfair trade laws
through executive orders." 8 One recommendation was to apply the
standard methodology in calculating FMV for United States AD cases
involving Russia. Although the calculation of FMV in dumping investigations should incorporate actual costs of NME in transition sourced
inputs when they reflect market pricing, 9 it is premature to utilize the
standard methodology for calculating FMV in cases involving NME in
transition manufacturers r ' The standard methodology is not applicable
at this time because the prices charged for the same or similar goods in
Russia or a third country may not reflect the actual cost of production.
Furthermore, because information on NME in transition manufacturers is
currently difficult to obtain and verify, a constructed value may not be

316. See supra notes 285-88
CVD liability for Russia).
317. See supra notes 189-92
Russian markets and politics).
318. See supra notes 282-85
tive orders by the President).
319. See supra notes 221-31

and accompanying text (proposing the exemption of
and accompanying text (discussing the volatility in
and accompanying text (proposing the use of execuand accompanying text (discussing an approach to

FMV utilizing market-driven NME in transition sourced input costs).
320. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing the standard methodology).
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determinable. Because information is so difficult to obtain and verify,
Commerce must continue to use the best information available standard
for calculating FMV.3 1' But as Commerce continues to investigate
NME in transition manufacturers, it will build a database of information
regarding the costs of NME in transition sourced factor inputs.
Finally, the Business Council recommended making NME in transition
manufacturers eligible for producer-specific AD duty rates." As was
evident in Certain Helical Spring Lock Washers From the PRC, a NME
in transition manufacturer such as Hangzhou should be allowed to prove
that it operated under market conditions despite government involvement
in the industry. 3" In that case, all Hangzhou's PRC sourced factor input costs reflecting market prices should have been included in calculating a separate AD duty for Hangzhou. Therefore, under the Business
Council's recommendation, Commerce should incorporate the manufacturer-specific AD duty rates in calculating FMV under the factors of
production methodology.324
The Business Council's legislative proposals are similar to those contained in the Administration's initial proposal. Like the Administration's
first proposal, the Business Council urges Congress to cast aside the
guiding principles of United States unfair trade laws and grant special
status to Russia. But granting special status to any economy in transition
country to increase exports to the United States may harm the broader
United States policy of promoting market reforms. The Business
Council's proposals for presidential action are consistent with the principles of United States AD law, except that the Council would grant
Russia the same treatment under the standard methodology as that accorded market economy countries. However, given the inability of Commerce to verify all the costs of NME in transition sourced factor inputs,
use of the standard methodology is not feasible. Rather, Commerce
should calculate a separate AD duty rate for those NME in transition
manufacturers that can show that prices for NME in transition sourced
factor inputs are market-driven.

321. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text (discussing the best evidence
available standard).
322. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text (noting the unavailability of
an individual dumping margin calculation to Hangzhou).
323. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (asserting the difficulty of rebutting Commerce's presumption of government intervention and control).
324. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (describing how the MOI test
could act to impose CVD liability on those industries which pursue industrialization
most aggressively).
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c. Proposalsfor Amending Section 406
The proposed amendments to section 406 suffer from many of the
same deficiencies as the Business Council's proposals. Section 406 is a
market disruption statute designed to protect the United States economy
from "sudden and deliberate" destabilization by hostile communist governments. 3" However, the AD law and not section 406 evolved into
the primary tool for enforcing United States trade laws in cases involving NMEs. As with both the Administration and the Business Council's
proposals, amendment of section 406 to provide special treatment to
NMEs in transition would be theoretically inconsistent with United
States unfair trade laws and a possible GATT MFN violation.
Additionally, an amended section 406 would likely retain some form
of ITC and presidential discretion necessary to provide remedies against
imports from NME in transition countries. Such discretion would leave
NME in transition manufacturers uncertain about which practices would
subject them to sanctions under United States law. If an amended section 406 permitted the United States to negotiate orderly market agreements concerning access to the United States market directly with economy in transition governments, the United States policy of promoting
market reforms would actually suffer harm. Since the amended section
406 would force NME in transition manufacturers to rely on their
government's negotiating skills, rather than the manufacturer's business
skills, for access to the United States market, the manufacturers will
continue to depend on their governments.
Moreover, since agreements rather than market conditions will determine the access of NME in transition manufacturers to the United States
market, less incentive will exist for the NME in transition governments
to pursue market reforms. This argument holds true even if the United
States government negotiates remedies under section 406 directly with
the economy in transition manufacturers. United States trade policy
should permit economy in transition manufacturers to sell their goods in
the United States without limitation, subject to a duty only if they engage in unfair trade practices. Therefore, amending section 406 will not

325. Carey et al., supra note 65, sec. III, at 16. The United States government
feared that a command economy government could harm vital United States industries

through an economic strategy of rapidly flooding the United States market with a
high volume of goods. Section 406 provides the United States government with a

mechanism to quickly respond to such a threat.
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provide a long term solution to the problem of how to administer United States trade laws in cases involving NME in transition manufacturers.
2. Further Recommendations for Changes in the Administration of
United States AD/CVD Laws Relating to NMEs in Transition
Just as Congress provided a definition of NMEs in section 1677(18),
Congress should provide statutory guidance to Commerce concerning the
definition and treatment of economy in transition countries.326 The criteria for designation as an economy in transition country should include
all six of the reforms economists believe are critical for a country to
transform successfully from a state-controlled to market-oriented economy.327 Furthermore, the statute should expressly recognize that the
goals of accuracy, fairness, and predictability in administering United
States unfair trade laws are best achieved by permitting Commerce to
calculate a dumping margin for individual economy in transition
manufacturer's products.3" The FMV calculation should include those
NME in transition sourced input costs that reflect market prices.
Additionally, the statute should firmly link the use of the AD law
with the CVD law in cases involving economy in transition manufacturers. The CVD law should apply regardless of whether the manufacturer
under investigation is entitled to an injury determination, because intellectual consistency dictates analyzing subsidies under the CVD law
rather than the AD law.329 Those economy in transition manufacturers
operating in non-Subsidy Agreement countries will receive the same
conditional MFN treatment as other GATT members unwilling to undertake the obligations of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. Finally, because each economy in transition country will
pursue market reforms at its own pace, the statute should not include a
time limitation. However, the statute should call for periodic reviews by
Commerce to determine whether market reforms are continuing. As long
as a country makes a good faith effort at implementing market reforms,

326. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing section 1677(18)).
327. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (outlining the steps economists
believe NMEs in transition must undertake to achieve a successful transition to a
market-based economy).
328. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text (advocating that Commerce
utilize the bubbles of capitalism approach of calculating FMV when analyzing NME
manufacturer actions under United States unfair trade laws).
329. See supra note 251 and following text (suggesting that Commerce should
analyze NME manufacturer actions under the CVD law).
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United States interests are best served by retaining that country's economy in transition designation. Therefore, the NME designation should
only apply to those countries that fail to implement market reforms.
Until Congress enacts a statute creating an economies in transition
category within United States unfair trade laws, Commerce can apply
the factors of production methodology in a fashion which rewards those
countries and manufacturers that implement market reforms. This approach should prove consistent with generally accepted principles of
United States unfair trade laws. Additionally, this approach should fit
within the framework of the economies in transition statute outlined
above.
Commerce started down the correct path when it announced the bubbles of capitalism approach to administering the factors of production
methodology.3" Indeed, Commerce could utilize a modified version of
the bubbles approach in administering the factors of production methodology in future cases involving NME in transition manufacturers. Although in the past the factors of production method produced significantly higher dumping margins than the standard methodology,33' permitting the use of market-driven NME in transition sourced input costs
to calculate FMV will reduce the inaccuracies in the FMV calculation.
As United States AD law is remedial rather than punitive, Commerce
should use NME in transition sourced input prices where possible. This
preserves the comparative advantage enjoyed by economy in transition
manufacturers in the input factors they use most, so long as they are
subject to market-driven pricing.3 Additionally, using market-driven
input costs promotes the deregulation of prices and wages within an
economy in transition country, thereby assisting in integrating the economy with international markets and help maintain a freely convertible
currency. Integration with international markets and currency
convertibility will occur because free trade requires that a country's
currency reflect the true value of the products produced by economy in
transition manufacturers, a value determined in large part by input and
wage prices.

330. See supra notes 196-220 and accompanying text (discussing the bubbles of
capitalism approach).
331. Kearney & Wang, supra note 65, at 1.
332. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing factor inputs and comparative advantage, and outlining the practical disadvantages for NME manufacturers
of Commerce's failure to use NME in transition sourced input cost in calculating

FMV).
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Where it is not possible to verify that NME in transition sourced
input prices are market-driven, Commerce must use the best information
available in choosing the surrogate prices to calculate the FMV under
the factors of production method. 333 However, Commerce should
amend its policy for choosing surrogates by first seeking a suitable
economy in transition surrogate, rather than immediately selecting a market economy surrogate. It is likely that an economy in transition surrogate with a market-driven factor input cost will have more in common
with the NME in transition manufacturer under investigation than a
market economy surrogate. This new policy would face initial difficulty
because of the few NME in transition manufacturers with market-driven
factor inputs determined by Commerce. But as future cases produce
NME in transition manufacturers with market-driven factor input prices,
a database of economy in transition sourced factor inputs with marketdriven prices will develop. In subsequent investigations requiring the use
of an economy in transition surrogate, Commerce would update its information to ensure that the factor input is still market-driven. This
updating should not prove much more difficult than searching for an appropriate market economy surrogate.334
This new surrogate policy would allow economy in transition manufacturers to prove to Commerce that certain factor input prices were
market-driven. This incentive should allow Commerce to obtain updated
information from NME in transition surrogates, provided Commerce
devises procedures to ensure that negative information collected against
the NME in transition surrogate is not used against that party in subsequent cases. This new policy should reduce inaccuracies produced in
applying the best information available standard to market economy
surrogates alone. In future investigations, Commerce should only use
market economy surrogates under the factor of production approach if
no suitable NME in transition surrogate is available.
Finally, as recommended by the Business Council, Commerce should
calculate manufacturer-specific AD duty rates for each economy in transition manufacturer that provides the required information, rather than

333. See supra note 291 (discussing the best information available standard).
334. An example of an appropriate market economy surrogate may be found in
the Final Lug Nuts determination where Commerce held that the PRC sourced steel
and chemical inputs where market-driven. Final Lug Nuts, supra note 207, at 46,155.
In future cases involving another NME country, the PRC steel and chemical industries
could serve as surrogate prices upon a review of the industry status to ensure they
were still market-driven.
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calculating one industry-wide rate."' Because manufacturer-specific duty rates reward those economy in transition manufacturers operating
under market conditions, manufacturer-specific duties provide an incentive for manufacturers to become efficient market-oriented producers. For
example, a firm-specific duty rate calculated under a revised bubbles of
capitalism approach would have benefitted Hangzhou in the Helical
Spring Lock Washer case. 3 6
Because the modified bubbles of capitalism approach would analyze
specific NME in transition sourced factor input costs and produces manufacturer-specific dumping rates, the modified bubbles approach will be
more consistent with the principles of United States AD law. Furthermore, analyzing specific costs and firms under a modified bubbles approach is analytically superior to the MOI approach, which only views
industries as a whole. However, using a revised bubbles approach would
trigger use of United States CVD law in economy in transition cases, as
it did in the Fans and Lug Nuts cases."
As discussed above, the use of the CVD law in conjunction with the
AD law protects United States industry by deterring market-distorting
activities.33 In denying foreign governments and manufacturers the
benefits of subsidies, countervailing duties deter governments from
granting, or manufacturers from accepting, subsidies on goods intended
for sale in the United States market. Therefore, countries imposing countervailing duties promote the efficient allocation of resources throughout
the world.339 Additionally, countervailing duties serve to promote the
reform measures necessary for NMEs to complete the transition to market-oriented systems successfully.
Applying United States CVD law against economy in transition
manufacturers will force them to cease exporting subsidized products to
the United States market. Eliminating such subsidy payments to inefficient producers will assist economy in transition governments in gaining
control of spending and reducing budget deficits. Reduced budget defi335. See supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text (outlining the Business
Council's proposals).
336. See supra notes 239-49 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty for a
firm to meet the MOI standard).
337. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying texts (finding that market pricing
under the bubbles approach led to CVD filings).
338. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the deterrence goal of
United States CVD law).
339. See supra text following notes 26 and 70 (discussing the beneficial effects of

United States AD and CVD law).
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cits will assist economy in transition governments in their attempts at
monetary reform to slow inflation. Finally, using the CVD law against
state-owned manufacturers will induce economy in transition govern-

ments to continue the privatization process.3" Thus, application of the
general principles of United States CVD law in cases involving economies in transition could actually support the United States policy of encouraging market reforms in NME in transition countries. 41
Although the use of the CVD law contributes to the market reform
process underway in NMEs in transition, Commerce has shown reluctance to use United States CVD laws against NME in transition manufacturers.342 However, Georgetown Steel, dealing with "classic" NMEs,
can be distinguished from future cases should Congress pass a statute
creating a separate economy in transition designation, or if Commerce
determines that economy in transition cases require a different analysis
than Georgetown Steel.343
When applying United States CVD law in cases involving economy in
transition manufacturers, CVD theory requires Commerce to attempt to
countervail the entire subsidy.3" Because of the market reforms underway in former NME countries, Commerce should not adopt the preferential treatment theory of subsidies discussed in Georgetown Steel.345
Rather, Commerce should establish commercial benchmarks within the

340. This is especially true if AD and CVD duties are calculated on a manufacturer-specific basis, rather than on an industry-wide basis.
341. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing the United States
policy concerning NMEs and the prospect that application of the CVD law would further this policy).
342. See supra notes 221-52 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce's application of the CVD law to economy in transition manufacturers and the implications
of Georgetown Steel for Commerce's future practice).
343. Another interesting issue involves assessing a CVD for the subsidy amount
remaining after a previously state-owned enterprise is privatized. Commerce can
choose to calculate the remaining impact of subsidies in the same manner as for
privatization efforts in market economies. Alternatively, Commerce could rely on
Georgetown Steel and determine that in "classic" NMEs, no subsidies exist for purposes of United States CVD law. Therefore, CVDs can only apply to subsidies granted after the country in question initiated market reforms. However, the measurement
of the amount of subsidy remaining after privitization is an issue which should not
affect the theory supporting the applicability of the CVD law to NMEs in transition.
344. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing United States CVD
law's goal of countervailing subsidies).
345. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce's reasoning for the non-applicability of United States CVD law to NMEs).
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economy in -transition, and if none exist, look first to commercial
benchmarks in other economy in transition countries before looking to
market economies. Adopting this policy for establishing commercial
benchmarks in calculating the subsidy amount is consistent with the
recommended policy in AD cases where surrogate prices are used. Harmonizing the approaches for selecting surrogates in AD and CVD cases
will promote consistency and predictability for United States petitioners,
and economy in transition manufacturers.
These proposals are merely a starting point for further debate. There
is no shortage of ideas concerning the policies the United States should
follow in its trade relations with economy in transition countries. But
whatever specific amendments to, or refinements of, United States unfair
trade laws are adopted, they must be consistent with the theories underlying United States AD and CVD law and United States obligations
under GATT. Furthermore, applying the AD and CVD laws in a theoretically consistent manner will prevent preferential treatment for NME in
transition countries which may, in fact, prove detrimental to their long
term efforts at achieving market reform.
CONCLUSION
A great many challenges lie ahead for countries seeking to transform
from state-controlled to more market-oriented economies. The United
States should actively promote and reward market reforms in these
countries by applying United States unfair trade laws in a manner that
ensures economy in transition manufacturers fair, accurate, and predictable results in AD and CVD investigations. Additionally, to the extent
the United States is an important export market for economy in transition manufacturers, the use of the AD law in conjunction with the CVD
law will deter the inefficient allocation of resources within economy in
transition countries. Utilizing United States AD and CVD laws in tandem will influence economy in transition governments to enact the programs economists agree are necessary for successful market reforms.
Commerce faces a difficult task in administering current United States
unfair trade laws in cases involving NMEs in transition. Commerce has
attempted to develop an approach for economies in transition that produces accurate results while protecting the interests of United States
industry. This task will be achieved if Commerce's approach builds
upon the general principles guiding the administration of United States
AD and CVD laws.

